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BAD SCIENCE BEGETS BAD CONVICTIONS: THE NEED FOR




The headlines trumpet delayed justice: "Innocent Man Freed after 35
Years has an Incredible Outlook on Life,"' "North Carolina Frees Innocent Man
Who Spent Half His Life in Jail,"2 and "DNA Helps Free Inmate after 27 Years."3
In the limelight is modem science's ability to rectify decades-old wrongs. There is
no question that scientific developments, particularly in the area of DNA, have ad-
vanced how criminal cases are investigated, prosecuted, and presented in court.
Overlooked in the wake of such acclaim, however, is the fact that forensic science
is far from infallible.
While progress in DNA testing has provided a more exacting tool with
which to explore guilt and innocence, scientific developments that call previously
accepted forensic techniques into question often escape attention. Headlines such
as "FBI Admits Flaws in Hair Analysis over Decades,",4 "How the Flawed 'Sci-
ence' of Bite Mark Analysis has Sent Innocent People to Prison,,5 and "Fuzzy
Math: Advances in DNA Mixture Interpretation Uncover Errors in Old Cases"6
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1. Christina Sterbenz, Innocent Man Freed after 35 Years Has an Incredible Outlook on Life,
Bus. INSIDER (Oct. 18, 2013, 9:04 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/james-bain-exonerated-after-
35-years-in-prison-2013-10.
2. Ed Pilkington, North Carolina Frees Innocent Man Who Spent Half His Life in Jail, THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2015, 3:33 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jan/23/north-carolina-
frees-innocent-man-joseph-sledge-half-life-jail.
3. DNA Helps Free Inmate after 27 Years, CBS NEWS 60 MINUTES (May 2, 2008),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/dna-helps-free-inmate-after-27-years/.
4. Spencer S. Hsu, FBI Admits Flaws in Hair Analysis Over Decades, WASH. POST (Apr. 18,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/fbi-overstated-forensic-hair-matches-in-nearly-all-
criminal-trials-for-decades/2015/04/18/39c8d8c6-e515-11e4-b510-962fcfabc3l0_story.html.
5. Radley Balko, How the Flawed Science' of Bite Mark Analysis Has Sent Innocent People to
Prison, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
watch/wp/2015/02/13/how-the-flawed-science-of-bite-mark-analysis-has-sent-innocent-people-to-jail/.
6. Jessica Gabel Cino, Fuzzy Math: Advances in DNA Mixture Interpretation Uncover Errors in
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underscore problems with forensic science that have largely escaped accountability
and remain unchecked.
Undoubtedly, forensic science is a vital component of the criminal justice
system. Thousands of guilty defendants have been convicted with the help of fo-
rensic techniques. At the same time, the Innocence Project estimates that forensic
evidence with little to no probative value caused or contributed to a wrongful con-
viction in nearly half of the DNA exoneration cases the Project has evaluated.
Many forensic techniques, such as hair and fiber analysis, toolmark comparisons,
and fingerprint analysis, rely upon little more than a matching of patterns where a
forensic analyst compares a known sample to a questioned sample and makes the
highly subjective determination that the two samples originated from the same
source. Although lacking a true scientific foundation, what passes as "science"
plays a prominent role in many cases because of the availability of trace evidence,
which is easy to leave and easy to find at a crime scene. Other forensic fields, in-
cluding forensic pathology, arson investigation, and firearms identifications, rely
on assumptions that are "under-researched and oversold."
In theory, scientific expert testimony must meet certain standards of relia-
bility before being admitted in court. In federal court and some state courts, the
Daubert standard governs the admissibility of such testimony. Under Daubert, a
judge acts as a "gatekeeper" and may admit scientific evidence as long as it is both
"relevant" and "reliable." 0 Other state courts have continued to follow the earlier
Frye standard, under which scientific evidence "must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs" to be
admissible. Despite these roadblocks to admissibility, courts have routinely ac-
cepted much of the so-called science underlying forensic testing with little, if any,
* 12inquiry.
Forensic science's armor has some cracks in it, however. In 2005, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") discontinued its Comparative Bullet Lead
Analysis ("CBLA") program, finding that "neither scientists nor bullet manufac-
turers are able to definitively attest to the significance of an association made be-
tween bullets in the course of a bullet lead examination."13 The FBI Laboratory
performed CBLA examinations for decades, and the resulting evidence was used to
7. Innocence Project, DNA Exonerations in the United States,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2016)
(stating that 46% of the 347 DNA exonerations "[i]nvolved misapplication of forensic science").
8. Jessica D. Gabel & Margaret D. Wilkinson, Good Science Gone Bad: How the Criminal Jus-
tice System Can Redress the Impact ofFlawed Forensics, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1001, 1002 (2008).
9. See Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
10. Id. at 597.
11. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 142
(Cal. 2007).
12. See, e.g., Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 258, 263-64 (Ky. 1999).
13. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FBI LABORATORY ANNOUNCES DISCONTINUATION OF
BULLET LEAD EXAMINATIONS (Sept. 1, 2005), http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel05/bullet
lead analysis.htm.
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convict many defendants.14 In 2015, the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") and
FBI formally admitted that almost every examiner in the FBI's microscopic hair
unit gave misleading, exaggerated, or otherwise flawed testimony in criminal cases
between 1972 and 1999.15 A cloud of doubt now hangs over cases involving hair
evidence, but they are not alone. A committee at the National Academy of Science
("NAS") concluded in 2009 that "no forensic method has been rigorously shown to
have the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate
a connection between evidence and a specific individual or source."16 Simply put,
the criminal justice system is "sendingpeople to jail based on bogus science."1 7
The President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology
("PCAST"), released a report on forensic science in September 2016.18 While the
Council acknowledged the ongoing efforts to improve forensic sciences after the
2009 NAS Report, its report also emphasized the significant problems in multiple
disciplines of forensic sciences.19 The PCAST Report focused on "pattern identifi-
cation evidence" - the evidence that requires interpretation by an examiner.20 The
main question asked by PCAST is whether these types of evidence are supported
by reproducible research.2 1
PCAST suggested that there are two types of validity a discipline of fo-
rensic science must pass.22 The first is foundational validity, which means that the
discipline is based on research and studies that are accurate and reproducible.23 The
14. Id; see also John Solomon, FBIs Forensic Test Full ofHoles, WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/17/AR2007111701681.html.
15. Spencer S. Hsu, supra note 4.
16. COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIENCE CMTY. ET AL., NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A PATH FORWARD 7 (2009) [hereinafter NAS REPORT]. In recent years, studies of certain fo-
rensic fields have demonstrated a lack of scientific foundation in the testing methods, identified serious
flaws, and questioned the continued use of such techniques. See INNOCENCE PROJECT ARSON REVIEW
COMM., REPORT ON THE PEER REVIEW OF THE EXPERT TESTIMONY IN THE CASES OF STATE OF TEXAS
V. CAMERON TODD WILLINGHAM AND STATE OF TEXAS V. EARNEST RAY WILLIS 40 (2006) ("The sig-
nificant lack of understanding of the behavior of fire . . . can and does result in significant misinterpreta-
tions of fire evidence, unreliable determinations, and serious miscarriages of justice with respect to the
crime of arson."); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADEMIES, BALLISTIC IMAGING 3 (2008)
("The validity of the fundamental assumptions of uniqueness and reproducibility of firearms-related
toolmarks has not yet been fully demonstrated.").
17. Kelly Servick, Reversing the Legacy of Junk Science in the Courtroom, SCI. MAG. (Mar. 7,
2016, 4:30 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/03/reversing-legacy-junk-science-courtroom.
18. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF
FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS, (Sept. 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast forensic science
report final.pdf [hereinafter PCAST REPORT].
19. Id at 1-20.
20. Id
21. See id
22. Id at 4-5.
23. Id
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second type of validity is applied validity, which means that the method is reliably
applied in practice.2 4 Among the disciplines of forensic science PCAST examined,
including DNA analysis, bite marks, latent fingerprints, firearms identification, and
footwear analysis, the only valid discipline (using both foundational and applied
validity) was single-sourced DNA analysis.2 5
What can the criminal justice system do about bad science? This article
provides an answer to that question in three parts. First, this article looks at the in-
ability of certain fields of forensic science to produce reliable results. Second, it
discusses problems with the current methods of challenging convictions based on
unreliable science. Finally, it proposes a new framework to better enable prisoners
to seek review of such convictions. What this article does not do is propose ways
to prevent wrongful convictions in the future. Many issues, including the need for
more research, accurate testing, judicial acceptance, and shifts in forensic laborato-
ry culture will need to be addressed in order to protect innocent individuals from
being convicted in the first instance. This article proposes a way to confront faulty
forensics retrospectively, by providing an avenue of relief for the numerous current
prisoners who were convicted based on misleading scientific evidence.
II. FAULTY FORENSICS: SHROUDING GUESSWORK IN THE CLOAK OF SCIENCE
The cases are many, but the differences are few. Whether it was a bullet
from a smoking gun or a fingerprint left on a glass, the evidence (and the alleged
science behind it) produced wrongful convictions. Critics have attempted to shed
light on the weaknesses in forensic science, but a policy of willful blindness pre-
vails. The examples below are only a fraction of the larger problem, but should
serve as a reminder that innocence cannot be ignored.
A. THE ERROR IN HAIR: MICROSCOPIC HAIR EXAMINATION
Hair analysis, also referred to as microscopic hair examination or hair mi-
croscopy, was used in criminal investigations from the 1970s through 2000, when
DNA testing supplanted it. Even in 2000, the FBI stated that hair recovered from a
crime scene was beneficial because it transferred during physical contact among
and between the suspect, the victim, and the crime scene. The logic followed that
24. Id.
25. Id. at 7-14. The PCAST Report received criticism for its findings, most notably from those on
the prosecutorial side of the aisle. See, e.g., National District Attorneys Association, National District
Attorneys Association Slams President's Council ofAdvisors on Science and Technology Report (Sept.
2, 2016), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20Press%20Release%20on%20PCAST%20Report.pdf.
PCAST responded in detail, noting: "Forensic science is at a crossroads. There is growing recognition
that the law requires that a forensic feature-comparison method be established as scientifically valid and
reliable before it may be used in court and that this requirement can only be satisfied by actual empiri-
cal testing." It also encouraged forensic science to be the author of its own destiny. EXECUTIVE OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AN
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hair evidence could be used to associate a suspect with a crime scene or a victim.2 6
Hairs recovered from a scene and hairs from a sample were analyzed and com-
pared against each other to determine whether a transfer occurred.2 7 Generally, this
evaluation was done by an examiner who placed both the sample and the evidence
under a comparison microscope for simultaneous viewing.2 That enabled the ex-
aminer to determine whether the hairs came from the same source.29
Although hair microscopy evidence received some criticism, it remained
relatively unscathed for decades.3 0 It appears, however, that the past-tense is finally
an appropriate fit for hair comparison. In April of 2015, the FBI admitted major
flaws in the analysis procedure.3 1 The DOJ and FBI "formally acknowledged" that
almost all examiners in a forensic unit gave flawed testimony in trials for over two
decades.3 2 The unsound testimony favored prosecutors in more than 95 percent of
the initial 268 trials that had been reviewed by April of 2015.33 Most often, this
flawed testimony was in relation to the level of certainty the experts claimed.34
"The review confirmed that FBI experts systematically testified to the near-
certainty of 'matches' of crime-scene hairs to defendants, backing their claims by
citing incomplete or misleading statistics drawn from their case work." 35
This review began in July 2012, when the DOJ and the FBI began an
evaluation of more than 10,000 cases in which hair analysis was used at trial.3 6 Be-
fore that, although hair analysis was considered to be "highly unreliable" by the
2009 NAS Report on Forensic Science,3 7 it still remained a feature in some cases.
Of the 268 trials reviewed by April 2015, at least thirty-five cases involved de-
fendants who received death sentences.3 8





30. See, e.g., Clive A. Stafford Smith & Patrick D. Goodman, Forensic Hair Comparison Analy-
sis: Nineteenth Century Science or Twentieth Century Snake Oil?, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 227,
229-31 (1996) ("[F]orensic hair analysis has been generally accepted by our courts for many years, with
little fuss or skepticism.").





36. Spencer S. Hsu, Justice Dept., FBI to Review Use ofForensic Evidence in Thousands of Cas-
es, WASH. POST (July 10, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/justice-dept-fbi-to-
review-use-of-forensic-evidence-in-thousands-of-cases/2012/07/10/gJQAT6DIbW story.html.
37. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FBI TESTIMONY ON MICROSCOPIC HAIR ANALYSIS
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Since these results became public, many other cases have come under re-
view.3 For example, in 1991 a man in Virginia was convicted of rape based on a
single hair found on the victim. 40 After testing the hair, the Innocence Project con-
cluded it could not belong to Darnell Phillips, who was sentenced to 100 years in
prison.41 He has been granted the right to test the new evidence.42 Additionally, the
DOJ proposed in March of 2016 to expand its review from hair analysis to include
fingerprint examinations and bullet-tracing.43
B. TAKING THE BITE OUT OF BAD SCIENCE: BITE MARK ANALYSIS
Bite mark evidence gained national attention in the Ted Bundy trial in
1979.44 Since then, American courts have time and again improperly legitimized
this allegedly "scientific" evidence.4 5 The common-yet untested-assumption is
that each person produces a unique bite mark, unlike any other in the world.46 Un-
like DNA analysis, however, there is no scientific basis for the testimonial that an
expert can identify a single individual based on bite mark analysis.47 As a result the
NAS Report recommended that the only probative value of such analysis in crimi-
nal prosecutions be in excluding an individual from suspicion rather than identify-
ing a suspect.48
In 2014, the American Academy of Forensic Sciences further evaluated
forensic odontologists and determined that they lacked the ability to simply con-
clude which marks were actually bite marks.49 What may initially appear to be bite
marks can actually be just another injury; a cut or scrape that looks strikingly simi-
51lar to a tooth pattern. Moreover, bite marks, unlike a dental mold taken of a sus-
39. Seth Augenstein, Four States Auditing Cases Involving Flawed FBI Hair Analysis, FORENSIC
MAG. (April 27, 2015), http://www.forensicmag.com/articles/2015/04/four-states-auditing-cases-
involving-flawed-fbi-hair-analysis.
40. Seth Augenstein, Virginia Inmate, Serving 100 Years for Rape Based on Hair, to Get New




43. Spencer S. Hsu, Justice Department Frames Expanded Review of FBI Forensic Testimony,
WASH. POST (March 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/justice-
department-frames-expanded-review-of-fbi-forensic-testimony/2016/03/20/ed536702-eed9-1 1e5 85a6-
2132cf446d0astory.html.
44. Radley Balko, It Literally Started with a Witch Hunt: A History ofBite Mark Evidence, WASH.
POST (Feb. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/02/17/it-literally-
started-with-a-witch-hunt-a-history-of-bite-mark-evidence/.
45. Id
46. NAS REPORT, supra note 16, at 173-75.
47. Id
48. Id at 176.
49. Souviron, R. R. The NAS Report, Forensic Odontology, and a Path Forward. Presented at the
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pect's teeth, are left in malleable material: human skin, making it difficult to truly
define the boundaries of an impression."
As part of a larger examination of forensic science for which the validity
has been called into question, in 2014 the Texas Forensic Science Commission be-
gan a sweeping review of cases where bite mark analysis played a role in the con-
viction.5 2 The Commission is now considering the validity of the entire field of bite
marks.53 Furthermore, the White House Science Advisor has also thrown doubt on
the reliability of bite mark analysis.5 4
The assumed reliability of "forensic odontology" is particularly dangerous
due to the esoteric nature of the discipline and the simple fact that most jurors and
attorneys are unfamiliar with either its terminology or methodology, and are more
likely to uncritically accept the conclusions of a bite mark expert. The cases of
faulty bite mark evidence are numerous and appalling.5 6 In March 2016, Keith Al-
len Harward was released from prison based on DNA evidence due to a rape con-
viction based entirely on the testimony of two forensic odontologists, who told the
jury that the bite-mark found on the surviving woman's legs conclusively came
from Harward.5 7 Harward spent 33 years in prison.s
Similarly, Bennie Starks was convicted of a brutal rape in 1986 and sen-
tenced to sixty years in prison as a result of faulty forensic testimony.59 The prose-
cution's forensic serologist testified that, based on her analysis of a semen sample
taken from the victim's underpants and a sample obtained from Starks, she could
not exclude Starks as the source.60 The prosecution also hired two dentists who
self-identified as "experts" in forensic odontology to testify that bite marks on the
51. Id.
52. Brandi Grissom, Forensic Science Commission will Investigate Convictions Based on Bite
Marks, DALLAS MORNING NEWS: TRAIL BLAZERS BLOG (Aug. 14,
2015), http://trailblazersblog.dallasnews.com/2015/08/forensic-science-commission-will-investigate-
convictions-based-on-bite-marks.html/; see also Texas Forensic Science Commission, Texas Bite Mark
Case Review (last visited Dec. 20, 2016), http://www.fsc.texas.gov/texas-bite-mark-case-review.
53. See Texas Forensic Science Commission, Texas Bite Mark Case Review (last visited Dec. 20,
2016), http://www.fsc.texas.gov/texas-bite-mark-case-review.
54. Radley Balko, A High-Ranking Obama Official Just Called for the Eradication' of Bite Mark
Evidence, WASH. POST (July 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
watch/wp/2015/07/22/a-high-ranking-obama-official-just-called-for-the-eradication-of-bite-mark-
evidence/.
55. Letter Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for Rehearing at 4, In re Richards, 289
P.3d 860 (Cal. 2012) (No. S189275), 2012 WL 7160188, at *5.
56. See, e.g., In re Richards, 289 P.3d 860, 863 (Cal. 2012); People v. Starks, 850 N.E.2d 206,
209 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
57. Seth Augenstein, DNA Exonerates Man Convicted on Bite-Mark Evidence, 33 Years Later,
FORENSIC MAG. (Apr. 11, 2016), http://www.forensicmag.com/article/2016/04/dna-exonerates-man-
convicted-bite-mark-evidence-33-years-later.
58. Id
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victim's shoulder had been made by Starks.6 The dentists testified that after com-
paring the evidence, photos, X-rays, and a model of Starks's teeth, the bite marks
shared sixty-two characteristics with Starks's teeth.62 Hearing the forensic "ex-
perts" testimony tying the defendant to the crime, the jury convicted Starks of two
counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, attempted aggravated sexual assault,
and aggravated battery.63
In 2006, after spending nearly twenty years behind bars, a DNA test cate-
gorically excluded Starks as the source of the semen.64 Additionally, two other
odontologists' independent examinations of the bite mark evidence completely
discredited the conclusions and testimonies presented at trial.65 Their reports point-
ed out that the examination method used by the State's odontologists had since
been rejected by its own creators and concluded that the dentists "misapplied the
methodology and used flawed preservation and photography techniques."66
The appeals court ordered Starks released on bond pending a new trial.67
His convictions were vacated and the last charges dismissed in January 2013,
which led to his full exoneration.68 During the twenty years Starks spent behind
bars, advancements in technology progressed exponentially (see the DNA that
helped set him free), and it left bite marks behind. Even though bite mark evidence
continues to suffer from fatal flaws and a low threshold of reliability, somehow it
still perseveres.
Bite mark evidence's absurd perseverance is equally obvious in the case
of William Richards.69 In 1997, a California jury convicted Richards in the murder
of his wife, Pamela.70 Bite mark evidence provided the proverbial smoking gun.7
The analyst testified that he compared an autopsy photo of Pamela's body to the
unusual gap in William's dentition and found a match.72 More than a decade later,
the analyst recanted his testimony and called the once-matching gap a defect in the
photo.73 To add insult to injury, the analyst further stated that he no longer even
believed the bite was made by a human.7 4 Finally, four other forensic odontologists
61. People v. Starks, 975 N.E.2d 71, 73 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
62. Id
63. Id at 72.
64. Id at 73.
65. Id at 77.
66. Id at 77.
67. Id at 74.
68. Innocence Project, Bennie Starks (last visited Dec. 20, 2016),
http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/bennie-starks/.
69. In re Richards, 289 P.3d 860.
70. Id
71. Id
72. Id at 865.
73. Id. at 948.
74. See id. at 956 (quoting Dr. Norman Sperber, the forensic dentist who testified as an expert at
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said that the photo did not offer enough detail to provide a match to William Rich-
ards.75
Roundly criticized as the "worst opinion of [2012],"76 the California Su-
preme Court upheld Richards's conviction.77 The court concluded that Richards
would have to prove that the evidence used against him went beyond the bounds of
exaggeration: he would have to prove that it was false.78 Thus, even though the bite
mark analyst retracted his prior testimony, Richards cannot fight the conviction be-
cause at the time of trial, the analyst thought he was giving accurate testimony.79 In
light of the decision, the California legislature has begun a series of amendments to
its false evidence statute, discussed infra,so and Richards has, yet again, found
himself in front of the California Supreme Court.
C. LATENT RELIABILITY: FINGERPRINT EXAMINATION
Fingerprint identification involves a comparison of questioned friction
skin ridge impressions from fingers (or palms) left at a crime scene to known fin-
gerprints. Once an examiner determines that there are enough areas of agreement
between the two prints, the conclusion is that the questioned print is attributed to
the suspect.82 Over the years, the terminology associated with this connection
ranges from "match" to "identification" to "individualization." These absolute
terms rest on a premise ingrained in our minds since childhood and prevalent for
more than a century: no two fingerprints are alike. In fact, there are three basic as-
sumptions on which fingerprint identification depends:
1. [N]o two fingers have ever been found to possess identical ridge
characteristics.
2. A fingerprint will remain unchanged during a person's lifetime.
3. Fingerprints will have general ridge characteristics that permit
them to be systematically classified and examined with great effi-
ciency and efficacy.83
75. Id at 975 (Liu, J. dissenting).
76. Radley Balko, The Path Forward on Bite Mark Matching - and the Rearview Mirror, WASH.
POST, (Feb. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/02/20/the-path-
forward-on-bite-mark-matching-and-the-rearview-mirror/.
77. Richards, 289 P.3d at 970.
78. Id
79. See id at 964-66 (determining that even though the analyst had changed his opinion following
the trial, new technology or advancements in the field had not rendered his initial testimony objectively
untrue; therefore, because of the "subjective component of expert opinion testimony," his testimony at
trial was not false under California law).
80. See infra Part IV.B.
81. Balko, supra note 76.
82. See DAVID R. ASHBAUGH, RIDGEOLOGY: MODERN EVALUATION FRICTION RIDGE
IDENTIFICATION 34-35 (1991), http://onin.com/fp/ridgeology.pdf.
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Since fingerprint evidence has been venerated for so long, its admissibility rarely
receives challenges. There is no actual evidence, however, that an individual's fin-
gerprints are unique to all others in the world.84 Instead, like hair analysis, finger-
print analysis is another exercise in an examiner's subjective attempt at visual
comparisons. Fingerprint evidence cannot fall short of admissibility, and for obvi-
ous reasons: it would upend more than a century of convictions.5
Indeed, American courts have (and will continue) to accept forensic fin-
gerprint identification without subjecting it to the kind of scrutiny that would be
required of novel scientific or technical evidence today. Courts accepted the un-
tested arguments that fingerprint identification was: (1) generally accepted, (2) sci-
ence, and (3) reliable. Courts also accepted the claim that there were no two fin-
gerprints in the world exactly alike. None of these claims were subjected to
adequate scrutiny from either a scientific or a legal standpoint.86 This logic requires
a leap of faith rather than a fact of science: that if no two fingerprints are exactly
alike in all the world, then the method of forensic fingerprint identification must be
correspondingly reliable. Judicial acceptance (and in some cases judicial notice)
became an important source in legitimating forensic fingerprint evidence. That is,
people outside the legal system believed that fingerprinting was scientific and reli-
able because courts said it was so.
Consequently, the interpretation of forensic fingerprint evidence must rely
upon the expertise of latent print examiners rather than on science. The NAS Re-
port underscored the shortcomings and called for research to measure the accuracy
and reliability of latent print examiners' decisions. Seven years later, however, re-
search is still wanting. Even later reports and investigations cannot seem to give
courts pause on the admissibility of fingerprint evidence. A 2012 report by a
Committee of 34 scholars and forensic scientists, including at least 12 working la-
tent print examiners, jointly convened by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology ("NIST") and the National Institute of Justice ("NIJ") recommended
that the report of the examination should ensure that the findings and their limita-
tions are intelligible to non-experts.8
Another report by the U.S. Justice Department Office of the Inspector
General" noted that the FBI Laboratory Standard Operating Procedures "now re-
84. See United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 852 (S.D. Ind. 2000) ("In roughly 100
years since fingerprints have been used for identification purposes, no one has managed to falsify the
claim of uniqueness by showing that fingers of two persons had identical fingerprints.").
85. Simon A. Cole, Does "Yes" Really Mean Yes? The Attempt to Close Debate on the Admissi-
bility ofFingerprint Testimony, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 449, 450 (2005).
86. Jessica D. Gabel, Realizing Reliability in Forensic Science from the Ground Up, 104 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, 285 (2014).
87. EXPERT WORKING GROUP ON HUMAN FACTORS IN LATENT PRINT ANALYSIS, LATENT PRINT
EXAMINATION AND HUMAN FACTORS: IMPROVING THE PRACTICE THROUGH A SYSTEMS APPROACH 94
(National Institute of Justice, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012),
http://www.nist.gov/customcf/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=910745.
88. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI's PROGRESS IN RESPONDING TO THE
RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON THE FINGERPRINT
10 VOL. 7
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quire that examiners create sufficient documentation, including annotated photo-
graphs and case notes, to allow another examiner to evaluate the examination and
replicate any conclusions, and they include specific documentation requirements
for each phase of the ACE-V process."89 Rarely does this occur, and there's little
incentive to effectuate a change. Such requirements have failed to sway the percep-
tion that latent print evidence is sufficiently reliable such that it deserves an auto-
matic "pass" into admissibility.
In a recent (and fairly notable) decision, the Seventh Circuit, in Herrera v.
United States,90 effectively approved of the free pass. Judge Posner, writing for the
court, concluded that a proponent of fingerprint evidence need not demonstrate re-
liability because it possessed some preternatural form of inherent reliability. The
court's substitution of its own unsupported indicia of reliability effectively created
a series of logical leaps that exceed the bounds of current fingerprint research.
Herrera found fingerprint identification evidence to be reliable for five reasons:
(1) the prosecution's fingerprint experts were certified by the International Associ-
ation for Identification ("IAI"); (2) none of the first 194 prisoners exonerated by
the postconviction DNA testing in the United States was convicted by faulty fin-
gerprint evidence;91 (3) Francis Galton estimated the "probability of two people in
the world having identical fingerprints" to be 1 in 64 billion; 92 (4) "errors in [fin-
gerprint] matching appear to be very rare;" and (5) examiner training encompassed
"instruction on how to determine whether a latent print contains enough detail to
enable a reliable matching to another print."93
Unfortunately, some of these points are factually inaccurate. Moreover,
not one point supports a conclusion that fingerprint identification evidence could
be admitted through expert testimony without a Daubert analysis. It is worth, how-
ever, scrutinizing the Seventh Circuit's analysis and reliability conclusion because
it represents one of the more recent (albeit bewildering) assessments of fingerprint
analysis.
MISIDENTIFICATION IN THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE (2011),
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s1105.pdf.
89. Id at 40; NAS REPORT, supra note 16, at 143 (citation omitted); see also id at 105-06 ("In
Maryland v. Rose, a Maryland State trial court judge found that the Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation,
and Verification (ACE-V) process . . . of latent print identification does not rest on a reliable factual
foundation. The opinion went into considerable detail about the lack of error rates, lack of research, and
potential for bias. The judge ruled that the State could not offer testimony that any latent fingerprint
matched the prints of the defendant. The judge also noted that, because the case involved the possibility
of the death penalty, the reliability of the evidence offered against the defendant was critically im-
portant. The same concerns cited by the judge in Maryland v. Rose can be raised with respect to other
forensic techniques that lack scientific validation and careful reliability testing.").
90. United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 2013).
91. Id at 486-87.
92. Id at 487.
93. Bradford T. Ulrey et al., Accuracy and Reliability of Forensic Latent Fingerprint Decisions,
108 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI. 7733, 7735-36 (2011).
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The fact that an occupation runs a certification program does not consti-
tute evidence about how accurately (or "reliably") members of that occupation per-
form various tasks. To have such evidence effectively creates a per se rule that cer-
tification breeds reliability.9 4 Beyond that, it seems misplaced to pin an argument
on the fact that the "first 194 prisoners in the United States exonerated by DNA
evidence" lacked a conviction based on erroneous fingerprint matches. This is, in
part, because Stephan Cowans, the 141st person exonerated by postconviction
DNA testing in the United States, was convicted in large measure on the basis of
erroneous fingerprint evidence.9 5 In addition, data demonstrates that at least five
cases involving fingerprint analysis errors are among the 337 postconviction DNA
exonerations to date.9 6 Finally, postconviction DNA exonerations neither provide a
representative sample nor statistically valid information about the prevalence of
fingerprint analysis errors.
The Seventh Circuit's assertion that the "great statistician Francis Galton"
estimated a probability of "1 in 64 billion" for two people bearing identical finger-
prints is also incorrect.9 7 Galton's estimate stemmed from a calculation of one spe-
cific "fingerprint" to another specific fingerprint (i.e., a 1:1 comparison).9 8 Gal-
ton's true estimate for the probability that a given fingerprint would be identical to
any other fingerprint in the world population (estimated in 1892 at 1.6 billion) was
a far more humble 1 in 4.99 At the end of the day, the pertinent probability related
to the court's question should have been the probability of finding the common
features between a suspect's known prints and the latent prints offered into evi-
dence against him if someone other than the suspect was the source of those latent
prints. It is well understood in the literature, and it was stated in the NAS Report,
94. Id.
95. BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS Go
WRONG, 106-07 (2011); Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint
Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 1014-16 (2005); Brandon L. Garrett & Peter
Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 73-74, 95
(2009); Elizabeth F. Loftus and Simon A. Cole, Contaminated Evidence, 304 SCI. 959 (2004); Jennifer
L. Mnookin, A Blow to the Credibility of Fingerprint Evidence, BOSTON GLOBE (Feb. 2, 2004),
http://archive.boston.com/news/globe/editorial opinion/oped/articles/2004/02/02/a blow to the credib
ilityof fingerprintevidence/; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Interested Scientists and Scholars in
Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15 n.22, United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480 (2013) (No.
12-1461), 2013 WL 3773550, at * 15 n.22 [hereinafter Herrera Amicus Brief].
96. The Innocence Project, The Cases, http://www.innocenceproject.org/all-cases/#forensic-
other,exonerated-by-dna (last visited Jan. 18, 2016).
97. Herrera, 704 F.3d at 487.
98. Herrera Amicus Brief, supra note 95, at 16 n.24.
99. FRANCIS GALTON, FINGER PRINTS 110-11 (1892); see SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES:
A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION 80 (2001); Stephen M. Stigler, Galton
and Identification by Fingerprints, 140 GENETICS 857, 858 (1995); David A. Stoney and John I.
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that neither Galton's estimate nor any estimate of the probability of exact duplica-
tion addresses this question.1 0 0
The Seventh Circuit's fourth reason for reliability-that "errors in [fin-
gerprint] matching appear to be very rare"-is a nebulous one. It lacks any empiri-
cal data to support the "appearance" of error rarity. The NAS Report found a
dearth of information on the error rate of fingerprint identification in 2009, and not
much has changed since then.101 Finally, the Seventh Circuit focused on the pres-
ence of training as part of its indicia of reliability. Simply because some examiners
are trained does not propel fingerprint analysis to reliability. If reliability can be
understood to be a three-legged stool, then one of those legs encompasses the reli-
ability of the specific examiner (the other two being the reliability of the method
and the reliability of the application of that method). That type of information
would be one of the subjects of a Daubert inquiry-not a reason to discount it al-
together. Yet, time and again courts have done just that.
As a post-script, there is hope for fingerprint analysis. In 2015, the Na-
tional Institute for Standards and Technology awarded $20 million to several uni-
versities to begin the process of developing comparable standards, research, and
statistics in pattern evidence analysis, including fingerprints.1 02
D. COMMUTED CALCULATIONS: DNA MIXTURES
For decades, fingerprints were the gold standard in criminal evidence. By
the late 1980s, however, DNA was poised to inherit that label. DNA brought a new
level of science to forensics-one built upon foundations of biochemistry, molecu-
lar biology, and genetics. But even DNA evidence can produce errors, and the po-
tential for miscalculations is particularly ripe in DNA mixture cases. DNA mix-
tures occur when two or more donors have contributed to a forensic sample.10 3
Because of the prevalence of this type of sample, many samples collected and pro-
cessed in forensic laboratories are DNA mixtures.10 4 Standard mixture analysis in-
volves taking a separate sample of DNA from a suspect and comparing it to the
mixture being tested.105 This means it is "inherently subjective - the analyst sees
the subject's genotype during the analysis."1 0 6
100. NAS REPORT, supra note 16, at 43, 144.
101. Id at 142.
102. New NIST Center of Excellence to Improve Statistical Analysis of Forensic Evidence, NAT'L
INST. STANDARDS & TECH. (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2015/05/new-nist-
center-excellence-improve-statistical-analysis-forensic-evidence.
103. MARK W. PERLIN, OBJECTIVE DNA MIXTURE INFORMATION IN THE COURTROOM:
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This method of comparison and analysis has been criticized because it re-
lies heavily on interpretation. For example, an individual reference sample may
have two allele peaks in common with the mixture sample.107 While this may seem
like conclusive evidence, one out of every fifteen people could match those two
peaks out of the sample.108 For unmixed samples, "analysts look at two sets of
peaks at a given locus: one for the victim and one for the perpetrator."1 09 But mix-
tures are a different story: analysts look at multiple peaks at the same loci "with no
indication of which pairs go together, or which source they came from." 110 Sorting
out which peaks belong to which individual is "highly subjective," but this DNA
evidence, combined with a statement from another involved perpetrator (given in
exchange for a lenient sentence), was enough to send a Georgia man to prison.
In the summer of 2015, the FBI discovered that numerous labs had been
using incorrect protocol when calculating the probability of a match from a DNA
mixture.112 Originally, the FBI believed this error would not affect too many cas-
es.113 But when labs began reanalyzing results, it became clear that the change in
protocol significantly changed the probabilities in some (but not all) cases.1 14 For
example, a Texas lawyer describes a case in which the original probability of the
DNA sample matching his client was more than one million to one.115 With the
new protocols in place, the lawyer believes the probability was significantly lower
- in the neighborhood of thirty or forty to one.116 Nonetheless, the Texas Forensic
Science Commission data states that the greatest difference in probability was from
1 in 260,900,000 to 1 in 225,300,000.117 Regardless of the true probability chang-
es, any change is concerning because it is not difficult to imagine a scenario where
a conviction was based solely, or at least primarily, on a seemingly conclusive
107. Chris Berdik, Dubious DNA, RESEARCH (July 21, 2015),
http://www.bu.edu/research/articles/dna-profiling/
108. Id




112. TEX. FORENSIC SCI. COMM'N, CLARIFICATION REGARDING THE TERM "CURRENT AND PROPER





115. Martin Kaste, 'Great Pause' Among Prosecutors as DNA Proves Fallible, NPR (Oct. 19,
2015, 5:30 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/10/09/447202433/-great-pause-among-forensic-scientists-as-
dna-proves-fallible.
116. Id
117. TEX. FORENSIC SCI. COMM'N, UNINTENDED CATALYST: THE EFFECTS OF 1999 AND 2001 FBI




xas%20NOTICE.pdf [hereinafter EFFECTS ONDNA MIXTURE INTERPRETATION].
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DNA match from a mixed sample." If there are doubts surrounding DNA mixture
evidence (whether it is in the accuracy of the result or the accuracy of the statis-
tics), it could affect many cases.
Because of these drastic differences, the Texas Forensic Science Commis-
sion began investigating the discrepancies.1 19 The Commission noted that the sci-
ence behind DNA analysis is still sound, but "well-defined guidelines for interpre-
tation are necessary when analyzing DNA samples containing multiple
contributors, because of the complexity of the samples and the possibility of miss-
ing data (e.g., allele dropout and other stochastic effects)."1 2 0 In August 2015, the
Commission released a letter to the Texas Criminal Justice Committee explaining
these issues and encouraging lawyers to determine whether their evidence was cal-
culated using "current and proper mixture interpretation protocols."12 1 A few
months later, the Commission released a list of criteria for evaluating laboratories'
DNA mixture interpretation protocol.12 2
Texas is not the only state to take notice of the limits of DNA mixture
analysis. In 2015, a New York supreme court discussed and analyzed the viability
of DNA mixture analysis in People v. Collins.1 23 Specifically, the court looked at
the "Forensic Statistical Tool" or FST, a computer program created by the New
York City Office of Chief Medical Examiner to calculate the likelihood that a
sample contains the DNA of a specific subject. 124 The court notes that "[t]he enor-
mous value of such statistical results, compared to simple statements like 'the indi-
vidual cannot be excluded as a contributor' is obvious-if the statistics are accu-
rate."1 25 The operative phrase here is if the statistics are accurate. After examining
the FST and hearing from experts in the field (on both sides of the issue), the court
ruled that the FST did not pass the Frye test and was not admissible.1 26 The court
also noted that it did not exclude the evidence because it was proven to be false,
but merely because it had yet to be accepted in the relevant scientific communi-
ty.
127
118. Katie L. Dysart, Managing the CSI Effect in Jurors, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION: SECTION
OF LITIGATION TRIAL EVIDENCE (May 28, 2012),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/trialevidence/articles/winterspring2O 12-05 12-esi-
effect-jurors.html.
119. See CLARIFICATION, supra note 112.
120. Id
121. See EFFECTS ONDNA MIXTURE INTERPRETATION, supra note 117.
122. TEX. FORENSIC SCI. COMM'N, CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION OF DNA MIXTURE INTERPRETATION
PROTOCOLS (Oct. 15, 2015),
http://www.fsc.texas.gov/sites/default/files/Texas%20Forensic%2OLab%2OMixture%2OCriteria%20 101
515%20(FINAL).pdf
123. People v. Collins, 15 N.Y.S.3d 564 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015)
124. Id at 577.
125. Id
126. Id at 587.
127. Id at 584.
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It is, however, important to note that DNA mixture interpretation has not
been completely discredited. Even with the issues described above, many experts
believe that the science behind DNA mixture analysis is still sound.1 2 8 Keith In-
man, a forensic science professor, says that laboratories are stuck in a hard
place.12 9 The newest analysis method for DNA mixtures, probabilistic genotyping,
takes time to implement, which has left laboratories knowing that a better method
exists but still being required to analyze samples using the old method.13 0 Similar-
ly, the New York court in the Collins case did not dismiss the DNA mixture analy-
sis entirely - it merely determined that the method was not up to the standards re-
quired by the scientific community.13
Nonetheless, juries still tend to give a great deal of weight to any DNA
evidence that points to a defendant.1 3 2 Until the technology and analysis methods
have progressed to the point of eliminating the potential for the results to vary
based on which laboratory completes the analysis, the criminal justice community
needs to be wary of placing too much emphasis or reliance on DNA evidence.1 33
E. RIDING SHOTGUN: FIREARMS EXAMINATIONS
Firearms analysis is another forensic science that has been subject to criti-
cism, but has not been completely discredited. Firearm examination can be divided
into two groups: internal and external ballistics. External ballistics refers to the
bullet's flight before it strikes a target, and terminal or impact ballistics, referring
to the bullet striking a target.134 It also includes the study of the flight path of pro-
jectiles.135 "Internal ballistics" pertains to what happens inside the gun from the
time it is fired until the bullet leaves the muzzle. 136 This can also be referred to as
firearm tool mark analysis.137 Internal ballistics often revolves around examina-
tions of rifling marks on a bullet and comparing those marks to those left by a gun
in evidence.138 This section focuses on internal ballistics.
128. CLARIFICATION, supra note 112.
129. Kaste, supra note 115.
130. Id
131. Collins, 15 N.Y.S.3d 564 at 577-82.
132. Dysart, supra note 118.
133. Kaste, supra note 115. "A lab using one method may find a match, while another lab, using a
more conservative analysis, may judge the same sample to be inconclusive." Id.
134. Firearms & Ballistics, FORENSICS LIBRARY, http://aboutforensics.co.uk/firearms-ballistics/
(last visited Dec. 20, 2016).
135. Id
136. Id
137. Adina Schwartz, Challenging Firearms and Toolmark Identification-Part One, 32
CHAMPION 10, 11 (2008).
138. Firearms & Ballistics, supra note 134. Rifling refers to the series of spiraling lands and
grooves is produced along the inside of the barrel. Id It will be cut with either a left or a right hand
twist. Id. Rifling leaves characteristic marks on bullets, which is the basis for the comparison. Id.
16 VOL. 7
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Firearms examination evidence has widely been accepted by courts, even
when evidence was challenged under the Daubert standard.139 Much like other pat-
tern examinations, internal ballistics has come under criticism for its subjectivi-
ty.140 As the 2008 NAS Ballistics Imaging Report noted, gun identification comes
down to a subjective assessment on whether or not the reference sample matches
the bullet from the gun in evidence.14 1 Firearms experts often testify that the bullet
in evidence was fired by the specific gun in evidence, to the exclusion of any other
gun.142 This statement has been walked back some (in response to criticism), but it
effectively operates the same-that it is a "practical impossibility" that another gun
could have made the same marks. The conclusion of the report was succinct: "The
validity of the fundamental assumptions of uniqueness and reproducibility of fire-
arms-related toolmarks has not yet been fully demonstrated."143 That conclusion,
however, was handicapped by a further statement that the "baseline level of credi-
bility" has been met by the existing research and the acceptance in judicial pro-
ceedings for years.144 Judicial acceptance should not be scientific evidence of cred-
ibility.
The 2009 NAS Report also addressed this issue, noting that there is not
enough known about the differences between guns to establish how many points of
similarity are required to attain a statistically significant quantification about the
accuracy of the conclusion.145 The report suggested that additional studies should
be conducted in order to make the analysis more "precise and repeatable."146
Adina Schwartz, professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, lists
three central pitfalls related to toolmarks and firearms.147 First, she discusses the
possibility that individual characteristics are actually a combination of non-unique
marks.148 It is entirely possible that examiners confuse marks that are made by two
separate tools with marks that are made by one unique tool.1 49 Second, she notes
that characteristics of marks can change over time.1 o In fact, "firearms and
toolmark examiners do not expect the toolmarks on bullets fired from the same gun
to ever be exactly alike.""' This is because the gun will change as it is used, as
well as from damage or corrosion.15 The final difficulty identified by Schwartz is
139. Paul C. Giannelli, Ballistics Evidence Under Fire, 25 CRIM. JUST. 50, 50 (2011).




143. Id. at 81.
144. Id
145. NAS REPORT, supra note 16, at 154.
146. Id
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the danger of an examiner confusing an individual characteristic with what is
known as a subclass mark.153 A subclass mark is a microscopic mark that distin-
guishes one type of gun from another, not an individual gun of the type from an-
other gun of the same type.15 4 Subclass marks are common to all guns of a certain
type."ss This type of confusion could lead to either false positives or false nega-
tives."'
III. THE CURRENT MODEL: INCONSISTENT AND INEFFECTIVE APPROACHES TO
BAD SCIENCE
The preceding section discussed how conjecture and exaggeration, mas-
querading as science, failed innocent people. The Innocence Project estimates that
faulty forensic evidence played a role in at least 51 percent of the convictions over-
turned by DNA evidence.157 It is impossible to know how many other innocent
people have been convicted based on the same faulty forensic evidence where
DNA is not available to exonerate them. Moreover, the preceding section only
identified a handful of problematic forensic fields. There are other forensic special-
ties with similar weaknesses.
While DNA has become the new arbiter of guilt and innocence, it has also
negatively affected prisoners who cannot take advantage of such compelling evi-
dence. States have enacted statutes that provide for postconviction DNA testing in
cases of alleged innocence. Lost in the shuffle, however, is DNA's other implica-
tion: that many fields of forensic science, despite widespread acceptance, frequent-
ly yield incorrect results. This section discusses the current framework for how a
factually innocent person can challenge faulty forensics if DNA evidence is not
available. As this section makes clear, the current postconviction framework (ab-
sent exculpatory DNA evidence) is ineffective to handle cases involving unreliable
science.
A. AVAILABLE METHODS OF SEEKING DIRECT AND COLLATERAL
REVIEW OF CONVICTIONS
1. DIRECT REVIEW
A motion for a new trial is the first form of direct review by which con-
victed individuals can seek to overturn their convictions on the basis of newly dis-




156. Id. (quoting United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 108 (D. Mass 2005)).
157. See Innocence Project, Unvalidated or Improper Forensic Science,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/unvalidated-or-improper-forensic-science/ (last visited Dec.
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which prisoners can move for a new trial. The rules of most jurisdictions explicitly
recognize newly discovered evidence as a basis for such a motion.ss
In most jurisdictions, prisoners have only three years or less from a par-
ticular event-usually the verdict or finding of guilty, entry of judgment, or sen-
tencing-to request a new trial based on new evidencel5 9 (though many jurisdic-
tions extend or toll this time limit if newly discovered evidence is the primary basis
for bringing the motion).1 6 0 The time limits vary widely among jurisdictions, rang-
ing from three years or more in federal court, the District of Columbia, and four
states,1 6 1 to a month or less in fifteen states.162 In four other states, a prisoner may
158. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1181(8) (Westlaw current through 2016 Reg. Sess.). The ex-
ceptions are Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana,
New Hampshire, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 33.3
(Westlaw current through Nov. 1, 2016); FLA. R. CRIM. PROC. 3.590 (Westlaw current through Aug. 15,
2016); GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 5-5-40, 5-5-41 (Westlaw current through 2016 Session of the Georgia Gen-
eral Assembly); HAW. REV. STAT. § 635-56 (Westlaw current through Act 1 (End) of the 2016 Second
Special Session); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-1 (Westlaw current through P.A. 99-912 of the 2016
Reg. Sess.); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30 (Westlaw current through Nov. 1, 2016); MICH. CT. R. CRIM. P.
6.431 (Westlaw current through Nov. 15, 2016); Mo. REV. STAT. § 547.020 (Westlaw current through
end of 2016 Regular Session and Veto Session of the 98th General Assembly, pending changes re-
ceived from the Revisor of Statutes); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-702 (Westlaw current through 2015
session); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 526:1 (Westlaw current through Chapter 330 (End) of the 2016 Reg.
Sess., not including changes and corrections made by the State of New Hampshire, Office of Legisla-
tive Services); TENN. R. CRIM. P. 33 (Westlaw current through Nov. 15, 2016); TEX. R. APP. P. 21.2
(Westlaw current through Sept. 1, 2016); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 24 (Westlaw current through Sept. 15,
2016); VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:15 (Westlaw current through Dec. 1, 2016); WIs. STAT. § 809.30 (Westlaw
current through 2015 Act 392, published Apr. 27, 2016).
159. See, e.g., ARK. R. CRIM. P. 33.3(b) (entry of judgment); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 33(b) (Westlaw
current through Aug. 1, 2016) (verdict); TENN. R. CRIM. P. 33(b) (sentencing).
160. See, e.g., ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 33 (Westlaw current through Aug. 1, 2016) (increasing time
from 5 days to 180 days); DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 33 (2016) (increasing time from seven days to
two years); MD. R. 4-331 (Westlaw current through Dec. 1, 2016) (increasing time from ten days to one
year); N.M.R. 5-614 (Westlaw current through Aug. 1, 2016) (increasing time from ten days to two
years); W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 33 (Westlaw current through Sept. 1, 2016) (removing ten-day limit).
161. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(b)(1) (Westlaw current through Dec. 1, 2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-
582 (Westlaw current through 2016 Sept. Special Session); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 33(b)(1)
(Westlaw current through Oct. 1, 2016); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2103(4) (Westlaw current through the
end of the 104th 2nd Regular Session (2016)); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 526:4; N.D.R. CRIM. P.
33(b)(1) (Westlaw current through July 1, 2016).
162. ALA. CODE § 15-17-5(a) (Westlaw current through the end of the 2016 Regular Session and
through Act 2016-485 of the 2016 First Special Session) (thirty days); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 33.3(b) (thirty
days); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.590(a) (Westlaw current through Aug. 5, 2016) (ten days); HAW. R. PENAL P.
33 (Westlaw current through July 1, 2016) (ten days); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-1(b) (thirty days);
IND. R. CRIM. P. 16(A) (Westlaw current through Nov. 1, 2016) (thirty days); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.04
subdiv. 1-1(3) (Westlaw current through May 1, 2016) (fifteen days); MISS. UNIF. R. CIR. & COUNTY
CT. PRAC. 10.05 (Westlaw current through June 1, 2016) (ten days); Mo. R. CRIM. P. 29.11 (Westlaw
current through Nov. 1, 2016) (fifteen to twenty-five days); MONT. CODE. ANN. §46-16-702(2) (2007)
(thirty days); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-29-1 (Westlaw current through 2016 Session Laws, Supreme
Court Rule 16-68, and 2016 general election ballot measures) (ten days); TENN. R. CRIM. P. 33(b) (thir-
ty days); TEX. R. APP. PROC. 21.4(a) (thirty days); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 24(c) (ten days); VA. SUP. CT. R.
3A: 15(b) (twenty-one days for motion to set aside verdict); WIS. STAT. § 809.30(2)(b) (twenty days). In
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potentially bring a new trial motion on the basis of newly discovered evidence at
any time, subject to the court's discretion.163 Only seven states allow a prisoner to
seek a new trial at any time.16 4
In addition to the often-limited amount of time available to seek a new tri-
al based on newly discovered evidence, a prisoner may only make such a motion if
several other requirements are met. For example, the evidence must not have been
discoverable by "reasonable diligence" prior to the time of trial.165 Also, the newly
discovered evidence may only be sufficient to require a new trial if a prisoner can
show that the evidence, if available at the time of trial, would have changed the
verdict.166 Many jurisdictions do not allow new trials based on new evidence where
that evidence would be used only for impeachment or is cumulative of other evi-
Hawaii, a court may extend the ten-day limit indefinitely, but may only do so within that ten-day peri-
od, in Utah, a court may extend the fourteen-day limit before expiration of the time for filing a motion
for new trial. See HAW. R. PENAL P. 33; UTAH R. CRIM. P. 24(c). In California, a motion for a new trial
must be made before judgment is entered. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1182.
163. GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 5-5-40(a), 5-5-41(a) (Westlaw current through 2016 Session of the Geor-
gia General Assembly) (motion for new trial must be made within thirty days of judgment "except in
extraordinary cases"); KY. R. CRIM. P. 10.06 (Westlaw current through Sept. 1, 2016) (motion for new
trial based on newly discovered evidence must be made within one year of judgment "or at a later time
if the court for good cause so permits"); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 33(B) (motion for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence must be made within 120 days of judgment unless "it is made to appear by clear
and convincing proof that the prisoner was unavoidably prevented from the discovery of the evidence
upon which he [or she] must rely"); OR. R. CIV. P. 64(F) (Westlaw current with 2016 Reg. Sess. legisla-
tion eff. through July 1, 2016 and ballot measures approved at the Nov. 8, 2016 General Election, pend-
ing classification of undesignated material and text revision by the Oregon Reviser) (motion for new
trial must be made within ten days of judgment "or such further time as the court may allow").
164. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 33(c) (motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence must be
filed "as soon after entry of judgment as the facts supporting it become known to the defendant");
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30(b) (Westlaw current through Nov. 1, 2016) (no time limit for new trial motions);
N.J R. CRIM. P. 3:20-2 (Westlaw current through Aug. 15, 2016) (no time limit for new trial motions
based on newly discovered evidence); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10.1 (Westlaw current through
L.2016, chapters 1 to 503.) (no time limit for motions to vacate judgment); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
1415(c) (Westlaw current through the end of the 2016 Regular Session of the General Assembly, pend-
ing changes received from the Revisor of Statutes) (new trial motion based on newly discovered evi-
dence must be filed "within a reasonable time of its discovery"); 234 PA. CODE § 720(C) (Westlaw cur-
rent through Pa. Bull., Vol. 46, Num. 50, dated Dec. 10, 2016) (new trial motion based on newly
discovered evidence must be filed "promptly after such discovery"); W.VA. R. CRIM. P. 33 (no time
limit for new trial motions based on newly discovered evidence).
165. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-17-5(a)(5) (20); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1181(8); IDAHO CODE ANN. §
19-2406(7) (Westlaw current through the 2016 Second Regular Session of the 63rd Idaho Legislature);
MD. RULE 4-331(c); NEB. REV. STAT. §29-2101(5) (2007); N.Y. CRIM. P. LAW § 440.10.1(1)(g); OHIO
R. CRIM. P. 33(A)(6); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-6-59(a)(4); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 7.8(b)(2)
(Westlaw current through June 15, 2016).
166. See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 851(3) (Westlaw current through the 2016 First
Extraordinary, Regular, and Second Extraordinary Sessions); MISS. UNIF. R. CIR. & COUNTY. CT. P.
10.05.3; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10.1(1)(g).
20
University of Denver Criminal Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol7/iss1/2
2017 BAD SCIENCE BEGETS BAD CONVICTIONS 21
dence introduced at trial.167 As a result, the requirements a prisoner must meet to
get a new trial all but ensure that an innocent person in many jurisdictions will not
be able to do so under direct review procedures.
2. COLLATERAL REVIEW
A. STATE POSTCONVICTION PROCEDURES
Every state has at least one postconviction remedy by which a prisoner
can challenge the validity of his or her conviction after direct approaches have
failed. These postconviction remedies may or may not be available to a prisoner
who claims that newly discovered evidence establishes his or her innocence. In
some states, a free-standing, or "bare" claim of innocence, which is a claim of in-
nocence that is not accompanied by a constitutional claim,168 cannot be the basis
for postconviction relief.169 Even where such a claim is cognizable, the standards a
prisoner must meet to establish entitlement to relief can be quite strict and nearly
impossible to meet.170
Each jurisdiction has particular procedural requirements that a prisoner
must satisfy to bring a petition for postconviction relief In several jurisdictions,
there is no time limit on when a prisoner may apply for such relief.171 In most oth-
ers, however, a court may waive the time limit only if the prisoner: (a) has a claim
based on new evidence that, with "due diligence" could not have been discovered
in time to be presented at trial;172 (b) has filed a claim within a certain time after
discovery of the evidence;173 (c) has a claim of actual innocence;17 4 and/or (d) can
167. See, e.g., Hester v. State, 647 S.E.2d 60, 63 (Ga. 2007); Stephenson v. State, 864 N.E.2d 1022,
1048 (Ind. 2007); Pippitt v. State, 737 N.W.2d 221, 226 (Minn. 2007); State v. Tester, 923 A.2d 622,
626 (Vt. 2007); Hicks v. State, 913 A.2d 1189, 1193-94 (Del. 2006).
168. See Michael J. Muskat, Note, Substantive Justice and State Interests in the Aftermath ofHerre-
ra v. Collins: Finding an Adequate Process for the Resolution ofBare Innocence Claims Through State
Postconviction Remedies, 75 TEX. L. REV. 131, 133 (1996).
169. See, e.g., LA. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 930.3; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.21(A)(1)(a);
Jackson v. State, 573 P.2d 637, 639 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977); Barbee v. Warden of Md. Penitentiary, 151
A.2d 167, 169 (Md. 1959).
170. For example, several jurisdictions require a prisoner to make a showing of actual innocence.
See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-1(2) (requiring that petitioner be sentenced to death and evidence
"establish[] a substantial basis to believe that the defendant is actually innocent" in order to establish
entitlement to relief based on newly discovered evidence); In re Weber, 523 P.2d 229, 243 (Cal. 1974)
(requiring newly discovered evidence must "point[] unerringly to innocence," to warrant habeas relief).
171. See, e.g., HAW. R. PENAL P. 40(a)(1); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30(a); N.M. STAT. ANN. §31-11-6(A)
(Westlaw current through the end of the Second Regular and Special Sessions of the 52nd Legislature
(2016)); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10.1(1).
172. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. § 3.850(b)(1); 42 PA. C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) (Westlaw current
through 2016 Regular Session Acts 1 to 169 and 171 to 175); see also N.J. R. 3:22-4 (excusing time
limit for claims that "could not reasonably have been raised" in a prior petition); OR. REV. STAT. §
138.510(3) (2005).
173. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-14-52(b) (2007); MCA § 46-21-102(2) (2005) (requiring peti-
tion based on newly discovered evidence be filed within a year of when evidence was or could have
21
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show that barring the petition on procedural grounds would be unjust.175 Generally,
second or successive petitions for postconviction relief are not allowed.176 None-
theless, a prisoner may be able to bring a successive petition if he or she could not
have raised the claim in a previous petition.177
The various hurdles placed in postconviction procedures work against the
wrongly convicted. Their entitlement to counsel suffers from similar disabilities. In
several states, the appointment of counsel is up to the discretion of the court or the
state public defender.178 Even where a prisoner has the right to counsel in a
postconviction proceeding, the appointment of counsel usually does not occur until
after the petition is filed. Without counsel, prisoners must either resort to proceed-
ing pro se, or forego postconviction remedies altogether. The lack of counsel di-
minishes (and perhaps prohibits) an innocent person's ability to challenge his or
her conviction.
B. FEDERAL POSTCONVICTION PROCEDURES
The disjointed patchwork of postconviction procedures is not unique to
state law. The federal system also establishes similar indefinite and unreasonable
requirements. State prisoners who have exhausted state postconviction remedies
and whose claims are not procedurally barred may seek habeas relief from the fed-
eral courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.17 As in many states, federal courts do not rec-
ognize a freestanding claim of actual innocence as a basis for relief In Herrera v.
Collins, the United States Supreme Court affirmed that without an accompanying
claim of a constitutional violation, a bare claim of innocence based on newly dis-
covered evidence does not warrant federal habeas relief for a state prisoner.180
The Herrera majority assumed for the sake of argument that a state pris-
oner sentenced to death may be entitled to federal habeas relief where the prisoner
makes "a truly persuasive demonstration of actual innocence" and there is no way
to pursue the claim under state law.8 While the Supreme Court has subsequently
been discovered); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-45(c) (Westlaw current through the 2016 session, subject to
technical revisions by the Code Commissioner as authorized by law before official publication.).
174. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.72.020(b)(2); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-102(b)(2).
175. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1507(f)(2) (Westlaw current through laws enacted during the
2016 Regular and Special Sessions of the Kansas Legislature).
176. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 19-4908; ME. STAT. tit 15, § 2128(3) (Westlaw current through July
29, 2016); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 7-103(a) (Westlaw current through all legislation from the
2016 Regular Session of the General Assembly).
177. See, e.g., COLO. R. CRIM. P. 35(c)(3)(VI); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-14-51; OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §
1086 (Westlaw current through Chapter 395 (End) of the Second Session of the 55th Legislature
(2016)); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07 sec. 4(a)(1), (c).
178. IND. R. POST-CONVICTION REM. 1 § 9(a) (2015); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30(c)(5).
179. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Westlaw current through P.L. 114-254. Also includes P.L.
114-256.).
180. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1993).
181. Id. at 417.
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declined to decide whether the exception suggested in Herrera does in fact exist,18 2
most circuits have recognized it in post-Herrera cases.183 Because the exception
would apply in such a narrow set of hypothetical circumstances, however, federal
habeas relief is effectively unavailable to prisoners convicted under state law who
seek to advance bare claims of innocence.
Federal prisoners who have unsuccessfully challenged their convictions
on direct appeal may petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. While the
Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue, two circuits have extended Herrera's
rationale to petitions brought under § 2255, the counterpart to § 2254 for federal
prisoners.184 Considering that the trend is for courts to extend Herrera's rationale to
§ 2255 petitions, federal prisoners with bare claims of innocence likely may only
bring those claims in a motion for a new trial.
In more recent renderings, the Supreme Court has allowed a proper show-
ing of "actual innocence" to excuse the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penal-
ty Act's ("AEDPA") statute of limitations. But those cases (as Justice Ginsburg
noted) are few and far between: "[A]ctual innocence, if proved, serves as a gate-
way through which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a procedural
bar, as it was in Schlup and House, or, as in this case, expiration of the statute of
limitations. We caution, however, that tenable actual-innocence gateway pleas are
rare."Iss
3. CLEMENCY OR PAROLE
Clemency is the "historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice
where judicial process has been exhausted."18 6 It is available under federal law and
the law of all fifty states.18 7 The United States Constitution vests the power to par-
don in the President, and most state constitutions similarly vest the power to par-
182. Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 57, 71 (2009); House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554-
55 (2006).
183. See, e.g., United States v. Sampson, 486 F.3d 13, 27-28 (1st Cir. 2007); Albrecht v. Hom, 485
F.3d 103, 121-24 (3d Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 118,
126 (3d Cir. 2012); Cress v. Palmer, 484 F.3d 844, 854 (6th Cir. 2007); In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 823
(Ith Cir. 2009); Cox v. Burger, 398 F.3d 1025, 1031 (8th Cir. 2005); Clayton v. Gibson, 199 F.3d
1162, 1180 (10th Cir. 1990); Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997) (en bane); Milone
v. Camp, 22 F.3d 693, 699-700 (7th Cir. 1993); Spencer v. Murray, 5 F.3d 758, 765-66 (4th Cir. 1993).
But see United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 68 (2d Cir. 2002) (emphasizing that Herrera did not
hold such an exception exists); Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 741 (5th Cir. 2000) (rejecting exist-
ence of such an exception), overruled in part on other grounds by Lewis v. Thaler, 701 F.3d 783, 791
(5th Cir. 2012).
184. Conley v. United States, 323 F.3d 7, 13-14 (1st Cir. 2003); Guinan v. United States, 6 F.3d
468, 470 (7th Cir. 1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500,
503-04 (1993); see also Sims v. United States, No. 98-1228, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 34746, at *5-6 (6th
Cir. Oct. 29, 1999).
185. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013).
186. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 412 (1993).
187. Holly Schaffer, Note, Postconviction DNA Evidence: A 500 Pound Gorilla in State Courts, 50
DRAKF L. REV. 695, 724 (2002).
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don in governors.8 Clemency is not without its own cast of procedural night-
mares.
In most jurisdictions a prisoner seeking clemency must have exhausted all
other possible avenues of relief1 8 9 In several jurisdictions a prisoner must have ad-
ditionally served a certain portion of his or her sentence before being eligible to
apply for clemency.19 0 If an application for clemency is denied, the prisoner may
have to wait a certain amount of time before reapplying, or may be barred from re-
applying altogether.19 1
While some jurisdictions permit the grant of a full pardon, including the
restoration of civil rights,19 2 other jurisdictions allow for the commutation of a sen-
tence only.19 3 As a result, a grant of clemency will not necessarily lead to a prison-
er's immediate release.194 The grant of clemency may be revocable in some juris-
dictions, subject to the grantee's compliance with certain conditions.1 95
Consequently, clemency is available in highly specialized circumstances and even
when granted may not provide adequate relief for innocent prisoners.
Parole does not offer any better alternative for a claim of innocence, and
most do not have that option. For those that do, they are generally required to ad-
mit guilt as a condition of parole.
Fred Swanigan was 20 years old when he was convicted of murder in
1980. With no physical or forensic evidence to link Swanigan to the crime, prose-
cutors built the case on four eyewitnesses who identified Swanigan as the killer.
While the California appeals court did not find those eyewitnesses to be terribly
188. U.S, CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; see, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 21; CAL. CONST. art. V, §
8(a); FLA. CONST. art. IV, §8 (a); ILL. CONST. art. V, § 12; ME. CONST. art. V, § 11; N.Y. CONST. art. V,
§ 4; OHIO CONST. art. III, § 11; VA. CONST. art. V, § 12; WIs. CONST. art. V, § 6; But cf, PA. CONST.
art. V, §9 (a) (allowing governor to grant clemency only upon recommendation of a Board of Pardons);
S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 14 (vesting only partial power to grant clemency in governor); TEX. CONST. art.
IV, § 11(b) (permitting governor to grant clemency only after a recommendation from the Board of
Pardons).
189. See, e.g., Apply for Clemency, NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND
COMMUNITY SUPERVISION EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY BUREAU, https://www.ny.gov/services/apply-
clemency (last visited May 15, 2016).
190. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 137.225(1)(a); Clemency Form, CONNECTICUT BOARD OF
PARDONS AND PAROLES, http://www.ct.gov/doc/lib/doc/PDF/form/PardonClemencylnstructions.pdf
(last visited May 15, 2016); see also ALA. CODE § 15-22-28(e) (requiring a unanimous vote to grant
parole unless prisoner has served certain amount of time).
191. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 638.02; ILL. PRISONER REVIEW BD., GUIDELINES FOR EXECUTIVE
CLEMENCY 1, https://www.illinois.gov/prb/Pages/prbexclemex.aspx (last modified April 03, 2013).
192. See, e.g., ARKANSAS LEGAL SERVICES PARTNERSHIP, PARDON (EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY),
https://www.arlegalservices.org/files/FSPardon.pdf (last updated October 2014); MASS. PAROLE BD.,
EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY OVERVIEW, http://www.mass.gov/eopss/law-enforce-and-cj/parole/exec-
clemency-unit/executive-clemency-overview.html (last updated Dec. 10, 2015).
193. See, e.g., FLA. BD. OF EXEC. CLEMENCY, RULES OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
https://www.fcor.state.fl.us/docs/clemency/clemency rules.pdf (last updated Mar. 9, 2011).
194. See, e.g., IDAHO ADMIN. CODE R. 50.01.01.450(1)(c) (2016).
195. See, e.g., MONT. ADMIN. R. 20.25.901A(2) (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 810 (2015).
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persuasive or reliable, the 1981 jury convicted Swanigan and he received a sen-
tence of 27 years-to-life in prison.19
Before, during, and after the trial, Swanigan maintained his innocence.
Once he became eligible for parole in 1996, he never waivered on his innocence
and refused to admit guilt. Admitting guilt-holding oneself accountable for the
crime-often factors as the key component of the consideration for granting parole
(in addition to risk assessment and recidivism).1 9 7 Recently, the California Court of
Appeals ruled that his claim of innocence should not be a bar to release.198 But for
the inmate who is innocent, this presents a problem: admit guilt and get out, or
maintain innocence and stay put. It is a no-win situation that often boils down to a
personal decision of how badly a person wants to get out of prison and what he or
she is willing to say to make that happen. Swanigan's case may seem like a rare
glitch in the system, but it is a common-enough occurrence that it even has its own
Wikipedia entry.199
B. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENTLY AVAILABLE METHODS OF RELIEF
As the foregoing overview suggests, a prisoner with a free-standing claim
of innocence based on the discrediting of a forensic technique faces a litany of ob-
stacles in seeking to overturn his or her conviction. The passage of time is a partic-
ular problem: relief simply may be unavailable after a certain amount of time has
passed. Even if there are available avenues for challenging a conviction, the high
standards for establishing exceptions to procedural bars and entitlement to relief
may effectively preclude a successful challenge.
1. FORECLOSURE OF CLAIMS BY THE PASSAGE OF TIME
In several jurisdictions, the time for moving for a new trial is limited and
claims of innocence based on newly discovered evidence are not cognizable in pe-
titions for postconviction relief For example, if three years have passed since a
federal prisoner's conviction, he or she may not move for a new trial on the basis
of newly discovered evidence.2 0 0 In addition, under Herrera v. Collins, he or she
may not seek habeas relief for a bare claim of innocence.2 0 1 In Louisiana, a prison-
er can only move for a new trial on the basis of "new and material evidence" with-
in a year after the verdict or judgment,2 0 2 and a claim of actual innocence is not a
196. Seth Augenstein, Calif Inmate Who Maintains Innocence After 35 Years Won't Be Released





199. Innocent Prisoner's Dilemma, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Innocent_prisoner%27sdilemma (l st visited Apr. 19, 2017).
200. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(b)(1).
201. 506 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1993).
202. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 851(3), 853.
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cognizable ground for postconviction relief unless the claim rests on the results of
DNA testing.2 03 In other states, a prisoner with a claim of actual innocence has an
even shorter window of time to bring a claim of actual innocence. For example, in
Arkansas, a prisoner must move for a new trial within thirty days after entry of
judgment,2 0 4 and newly discovered evidence is not a ground for postconviction re-
lief 205 The overriding theme is that time does not stop for innocence.
In addition to time constraints, jurisdictions impose substantive criteria on
prisoners seeking relief for claims of innocence that may result in limiting relief to
narrow circumstances. For example, in Illinois, only prisoners sentenced to death
may bring claims based on newly discovered evidence, and even then only if the
evidence "establishes a substantial basis to believe that the defendant is actually
innocent by clear and convincing evidence."2 0 6 Because the time limit for bringing
a new trial motion in Illinois is thirty days after the verdict,207 a prisoner convicted
of a non-capital crime is not able to challenge his or her conviction on the basis of
a claim of innocence after that time has passed. The crazy part to this is that Illi-
nois abolished the death penalty in 2011, but this draconian law remains on the
books.2 08
Even if a claim of innocence on the basis of newly discovered evidence is
cognizable in a petition for postconviction relief, strict procedural requirements for
bringing such petitions, in combination with the time limit for bringing a motion
for a new trial, may also render relief unavailable after a certain amount of time
has passed. For example, while Alaska law recognizes newly discovered evidence
as a basis for postconviction relief, a prisoner may only file one motion for
postconviction relief, without exception.2 0 9 Where a prisoner cannot bring either a
motion for a new trial or a petition for postconviction relief after a certain period of
time, clemency will be the only form of relief left. The granting of clemency, how-
ever, is extremely rare.2 1 0 A prisoner whose only chance at being exonerated is to
203. Id. at art. 930.3.
204. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 33.3(B).
205. Chisum v. State, 625 S.W.2d 448, 449 (Ark. 1981). In Tennessee, a prisoner must move for a
new trial within thirty days after sentencing, and postconviction relief is only available for claims of
constitutional error, not claims based on newly discovered evidence of innocence. TENN. R. CRIM. P.
33(b); see also Myers v. State, No. M2004-02411-CCA-MR3-PC, 2005 LEXIS 676, at *11-14 (Tenn.
Crim. App. June 29, 2005).
206. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-1 (a)(2).
207. Id. at 5/116-1(b).
208. Illinois Abolishes the Death Penalty, NRP (Mar. 9, 2011),
http://www.npr.org/2011/03/09/134394946/illinois-abolishes-death-penalty.
209. ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.72.010(4), 12.72.020(a)(6) (2006). See generally id at §12.72.020.
Similarly, in Delaware, a prisoner must apply for postconviction relief within a year of final judgment,
regardless of what the claimed ground for relief is. DEL. R. CRIM. P. 61(i)(1). In combination with the
sixty day limit on bringing a motion for a new trial, this strict statute of limitations bars any review of a
conviction after a certain amount of time has passed. DEL. R. CRIM. P. 33.
210. Molly M Gill, FAMM Seeks Commutation Cases to Spark Sentencing Reform, National Asso-
ciation of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Nov. 2007, at 8 (observing that clemency is rarely granted); Ad-
am M. Gershowitz, The Diffusion of Responsibility in Capital Clemency, 17 J.L. & POLITICS 669, 671
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seek clemency faces an uphill battle, both because of the political considerations
that make executives reluctant to grant pardons and because of the lack of checks
on an executive's discretion to refuse relief.211
When a motion for a new trial or a postconviction petition are no longer
available, even an innocent prisoner has little hope of gaining freedom. On the
whole, states differ dramatically in the availability and procedural aspects of
postconviction relief In practice, however, the effect is the same: an innocent per-
son may well be in no better position to be released from prison than a guilty one.
2. THE DIFFICULTY OF ESTABLISHING EXCEPTIONS TO
PROCEDURAL BARS AND ENTITLEMENT TO RELIEF
Even if a claim of innocence based on the discrediting of a forensic tech-
nique may be a basis for postconviction relief, there are usually high standards for
establishing entitlement to relief and exceptions to procedural bars. It may be diffi-
cult for prisoners with such claims to advance them through traditional
postconviction remedies. One potential pitfall is that the discrediting of a forensic
technique is not a traditional form of newly discovered evidence, so that the sub-
stantive and procedural rules which involve a showing of newly discovered evi-
dence may not be easy to meet. A related problem is that the discrediting of a fo-
rensic technique may nullify evidence used to convict a person at trial, but does not
have the potential to conclusively prove that person's innocence. Thus, prisoners
convicted on the basis of a discredited forensic testing technique may not be able
to make a sufficient showing of innocence. Finally, because the laws of many ju-
risdictions either do not provide for a right to counsel in postconviction proceed-
ings or do so only after a petition is filed, many prisoners will be in the position of
filing a petition for postconviction relief without the assistance of counsel. As a
result, petitioners with meritorious claims may not have the chance to present them
adequately, if at all, much less obtain relief based upon them.
Characterizing a recently discredited forensic technique as newly discov-
ered evidence raises the issue of when a technique is sufficiently discredited to
constitute new evidence. To illustrate the gravity of these cases, look to the case of
212Santae Tribble. He was convicted of killing a taxi driver in 1978. During the in-
(2001) (nothing that the granting of clemency "has dramatically declined in the last few decades."),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/1260.
211. Arleen Anderson, Responding to the Challenge of Actual Innocence Claims After Herrara v.
Collins, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 489, 514-15 (1998) ([E]xecutive clemency is vulnerable to the whims of the
political process ... [and] 'possesses.. .a lack of guaranteed procedural safeguards and, given the de-
gree of discretion, a risk of arbitrary denial.' " (quoting Vivian Berger, Herrera v. Collins; The Gate-
way ofInnocence for Death-Sentenced Prisoners Leads Nowhere, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 1009
(1994)); Nicholas Berg, Note, Turning a Blind Eye to Innocence: The Legacy ofHerrera v. Collins, 42
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121, 145-146 (2005) ("[T]he clemency process poses three major problems: (1) it is
subject to the whims of the political process, (2) it lacks guaranteed procedural safeguards, and (3) its
use is approaching the vanishing point.").
212. Spencer S. Hsu, Convicted Defendants Left Uninformed of Forensic Flaws Found by Justice
Dept., WASH POST, (Apr. 16, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/convicted-
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vestigation, a police dog uncovered a stocking mask one block away from the
crime scene; the stocking contained a total of 13 hairs. The FBI's hair analysis
concluded that one of the 13 hairs belonged to Tribble. Tribble took the stand in
his defense, testifying that he had no connection to the taxi driver's death. Never-
theless, the jurors gave weight to the one "matching" hair and found Tribble guilty
of murder. The judge sentenced him to 20 years-to-life in prison.2 13
Both in prison and later, while on parole, Tribble maintained his inno-
cence, and in January 2012, Tribble's lawyer, succeeded in having the evidence
retested. A private lab concluded through DNA testing that the hairs could not
have belonged to Tribble.2 14 A more thorough analysis at the time of the crime-
even absent DNA testing-would have revealed the same result: one hair had Cau-
casian characteristics and Tribble is African-American. Tribble served 25 years,
plus an additional three years for failing to meet the conditions of his parole for a
crime he did not commit.2 15
In another case, Kirk L. Odom was convicted of sexual assault in 1981.216
The star prosecution witness-an FBI Special Agent-testified that a hair discov-
ered on the victim's nightgown was microscopically similar to Odom's hair,
"meaning the samples were indistinguishable."2 17 To illustrate the credibility of the
evidence, the agent also testified that he had concluded hair samples to be indistin-
guishable only "eight or 10 times in the past 10 years, while performing thousands
of analyses."2 18 Odom presented alibi evidence, but the jury convicted him after
just a few hours of deliberation. Odom was paroled in March 2003 and required to
register as a sex offender.2 1 9
That would have been the end of Odom's story had it not been for his
lawyer's crusade to right the wrongs resulting from the erroneous hair compari-
sons.220 In February 2011, Sandra Levick (who had also represented Tribble) filed
a motion for DNA testing under the D.C. Innocence Protection Act.2 2 1 In response,









219. Innocence Project, Kirk Odom, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/kirk-odom/ (last visited
Dec. 21, 2016).
220. Spencer S. Hsu, Kirk L. Odom Officially Exonerated; DNA Retesting Cleared Him in D.C.
Rape, Robbery, WASH. POST, (July 13, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/kirk-l-
odom-officially-exonerated-dna-retesting-cleared-him-in-dc-rape-
robbery/2012/07/13/gJQAuH3piW story.html.
221. See Kirk Odom, supra note 219; Innocence Project, Santae Tribble,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/santae-tribble/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2016).
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ined hair from the crime scene.22 Subsequent DNA testing of those items, in addi-
tion to mitochondrial testing of the suspect hair, excluded Odom.22 A convicted
sex offender would later be linked to the crime, and Odom was exonerated on July
13, 2012.224
The Tribble and Odom cases illustrate one potential conundrum for pris-
oners using currently available avenues to challenge convictions based on a claim
of a forensic testing technique being discredited: the evidence must cast sufficient
doubt upon a forensic testing technique in order to support a claim. Thus, prisoners
must wait for scientists to do research that discredits the technique to a satisfactory
degree. On the other hand, once evidence that does sufficiently discredit the tech-
nique becomes available, a prisoner may have to bring a claim based on that evi-
dence quickly in order to comply with applicable time limits. Consequently, the
prisoner must negotiate the fine balance between waiting to gather enough evi-
dence to demonstrate that a forensic technique is unreliable and risking the possi-
bility that more conclusive research will be done but will not come to the prison-
er's attention.
3. POSTCONVICTION DISCOVERY AND PRESENTATION OF
EVIDENCE
Another problem faced by prisoners in using current procedures to chal-
lenge their convictions is obtaining the evidence necessary to establish their
claims. Postconviction DNA testing statutes provide a procedure by which prison-
ers can obtain testing of biological evidence associated with their convictions, usu-
ally at the state's expense if the prisoner is indigent.2 2 5 In addition, DNA testing
statutes may provide for access to other relevant evidence, such as the results of
221
previous testing. In contrast, the rules governing new trial motions and
postconviction procedures are usually silent on the issue of discovery. As a result,
there is no clear mechanism by which prisoners can acquire the physical evidence
used in a particular forensic technique and other relevant information that may be
used to prove their innocence.
Further, even if prisoners can gather the relevant evidence, they may be
handcuffed by the high standards they must meet to show their innocence. In Tex-
as, for instance, "[e]stablishing a bare claim of innocence is a Herculean task."
2 27
To establish entitlement to relief, "the applicant must show 'by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that, despite the evidence of guilt that supports the conviction, no rea-
sonable juror could have found the applicant guilty in light of the new evidence.'
This showing must . .. unquestionably establish [the] applicant's innocence."22 8 In
222. See Kirk Odom, supra note 219.
223. Id
224. See id.
225. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3600(a), (c)(3); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-269(a), (d5).
226. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405(d)(1).
227. Exparte Brown, 205 S.W.3d 538, 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
228. Id (quoting Exparte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).
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addition, the applicant must provide "affirmative evidence" of innocence, not just
raise doubt about his or her guilt.229
As explained below, it may be easier to discredit forensic science in Texas
than it is to demonstrate actual innocence. The innocent applicant would need "af-
firmative evidence" that "unquestionably establishes" a prisoner's innocence. Even
assuming that a forensic technique was shown to be completely unreliable, it will
not provide affirmative evidence of a prisoner's innocence.
For example, if a prisoner showed that hair evidence was not a legitimate
technique, it would, at most, exclude a hair from belonging to the suspect or the
victim. While this might remove a critical piece of evidence from the conviction
equation, such a showing would not prove that a prisoner did not commit the crime
at issue. Because hair evidence cannot be used to tie individual hairs to individual
persons, it cannot be used to prove that a person was or was not associated with the
crime or the victim. Thus, a prisoner challenging his or her conviction in a jurisdic-
tion that requires a strong showing of innocence probably will not be entitled to
relief even if he or she conclusively shows that a forensic testing technique has in-
sufficient probative value.
In many cases, even if a prisoner could otherwise establish exceptions to
procedural bars to relief, he or she will not have the help of counsel in preparing a
petition for postconviction relief Where the discrediting of a forensic technique is
the basis for a claim, it is important to obtain scientific research in support of the
technique's discreditation. Without the aid of counsel, a prisoner will be poorly po-
sitioned to marshal the evidence necessary to support a petition and avoid its sum-
mary dismissal. Texas law does not make any provision for the appointment of
counsel to aid indigent, non-capital prisoners in filing habeas petitions.230 After fil-
ing, for the petition to proceed, the judge must find "controverted, previously unre-
solved facts which are material to the legality of the applicant's confinement."231
Even then, the judge has the discretion to decide whether to hold an evidentiary
232hearing. In light of such stringent requirements for establishing a claim of inno-
cence, a prisoner who files a petition without the aid of counsel may not be able to
highlight the new evidence establishing his or her innocence and state a claim suf-
ficient to require further consideration.
The need for the aid of counsel is even more pronounced in jurisdictions
that have detailed requirements governing the contents of postconviction petitions.
For example, in Virginia, a prisoner with a claim of innocence based on newly dis-
covered evidence may file a petition for a "writ of actual innocence."23 3 If newly
discovered "nonbiological evidence" is the basis for the petition, the prisoner must
229. Exparte Franklin, 72 S.W.3d 671, 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
230. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(a); cf id at art. 11.071 § 2.
231. Id. at art. 11.07 § 3(d).
232. Id.
233. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.2 to 19.2-327.14.
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allege, "categorically, and with specificity," a detailed list of eight facts.2 3 4 In addi-
tion, the "petition [must] contain all relevant allegations of facts that are known to
the petitioner at the time of filing, [must] be accompanied by all relevant docu-
ments, affidavits and test results, and [must] enumerate and include all relevant
previous records, applications, petitions, appeals and their dispositions."2 3 5 Com-
pliance with these requirements is necessary to avoid summary dismissal.2 3 6 Unfor-
tunately, a petitioner is entitled to counsel only after, and only if, the petition is not
summarily dismissed.2 37 Furthermore, it is up to the court's discretion whether to
appoint counsel before deciding whether to summarily dismiss a petition.2 38 With-
out the aid of counsel, it is much less likely that a prisoner with a claim of inno-
cence based on a discredited forensic technique will be able to prepare a petition
that complies with Virginia's strict requirements.
IV. WRIT LARGE: THE NEED FOR JUNK SCIENCE STATUTES
The previous section provided just a handful of examples that illustrate
the obstacles in proving that bad science produced a wrongful conviction. As the
foregoing demonstrates, current postconviction remedies are insufficient to man-
age the evolution or test the bounds of science in the courtroom. Absent changes to
currently available methods of relief, innocent people will remain in prison, con-
victed by unreliable science.However, two states have made positive steps toward
statutory schemes aimed squarely at addressing bad science.
A. THE TEXAS TWO-STEP: A FORENSIC SCIENCE BOARD AND A JUNK
SCIENCE STATUTE
In June 2013, the Texas legislature adopted Article 11.073 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure to provide postconviction relief to individuals wrongfully con-
234. Id. at § 19.2-327.11(A) ("The petitioner shall allege categorically and with specificity, under
oath, all of the following: (i) the crime for which the petitioner was convicted, and that such conviction
was upon a plea of not guilty; (ii) that the petitioner is actually innocent of the crime for which he was
convicted; (iii) an exact description of the previously unknown or unavailable evidence supporting the
allegation of innocence; (iv) that such evidence was previously unknown or unavailable to the petitioner
or his trial attorney of record at the time the conviction became final in the circuit court; (v) the date the
previously unknown or unavailable evidence became known or available to the petitioner, and the cir-
cumstances under which it was discovered; (vi) that the previously unknown or unavailable evidence is
such as could not, by the exercise of diligence, have been discovered or obtained before the expiration
of 21 days following entry of the final order of conviction by the court; (vii) the previously unknown or
unavailable evidence is material and when considered with all of the other evidence in the current rec-
ord, will prove that no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt;
and (viii) the previously unknown or unavailable evidence is not merely cumulative, corroborative or
collateral.").
235. Id at § 19.2-327.11(B).
236. Id at §§ 19.2-327.11(B), (D).
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victed as a result of unavailable or erroneous scientific evidence.2 39 The statute was
initially enacted in response to the denial of Neal Hampton Robbin's application
for writ of habeas corpus for a conviction of capital murder under Article 11.07 of
the Code of Criminal Procedures, the state's false evidence statute, and a claim of
actual innocence.240 In Ex Parte Robbins, the defendant was convicted of capital
murder based in part on the testimony of the assistant medical examiner who per-
formed an autopsy on the child victim's body and declared the cause of death to
have been homicide.2 4 1 After the medical examiner revised her opinion, finding the
cause of death to have been "undetermined,"242 Robbins applied for a writ of habe-
243as corpus. The court denied relief, holding that the State did not use false evi-
dence to obtain the defendant's conviction because, although subsequently revised,
the medical examiner's trial testimony was not false and did not create a false im-
239. TEX. SESS. LAW SERV. ch. 410 (S.B. 344) (West 2013), amended by TEX. SESS. LAW SERV.
Ch. 1263 (H.B. 3724) (West 2015).
The Statute provides:
(a) This article applies to relevant scientific evidence that:
(1) was not available to be offered by a convicted person at the convicted per-
son's trial; or
(2) contradicts scientific evidence relied on by the state at trial.
(b) A court may grant a convicted person relief on an application for a writ of ha-
beas corpus if:
(1) the convicted person files an application, in the manner provided by Article
11.07, 11.071, or 11.072, containing specific facts indicating that:
(A) relevant scientific evidence is currently available and was not available at the
time of the convicted person's trial because the evidence was not ascertainable
through the exercise of reasonable diligence by the convicted person before the
date of or during the convicted person's trial; and
(2) the court makes the findings described by Subdivisions (1)(A) and (B) and al-
so finds that, had the scientific evidence been presented at trial, on the prepon-
derance of the evidence the person would not have been convicted.
(d) In making a finding as to whether relevant scientific evidence was not ascer-
tainable through the exercise of reasonable diligence on or before a specific date,
the court shall consider whether the field of scientific knowledge, a testifying ex-
pert's scientific knowledge, or a scientific method on which the relevant scien-
tific evidence is based has changed since:
(1) the applicable trial date or dates, for a determination made with respect to an
original application; or
(2) the date on which the original application or a previously considered applica-
tion, as applicable, was filed, for a determination made with respect to a subse-
quent application.
Id
240. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 11.073.
241. Robbins v. State, 27 S.W.3d 245 (Tex. App. 2000), aff'd, 88 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. App. 2002).
242. Id
243. Exparte Robbins, 360 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
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pression. The court further held that the medical examiner's re-evaluation of her
trial opinion did not unquestionably establish defendant's innocence.2 4 4
Initially proposed in February 2013, adopted in June 2013, and effective
as of September 2013, Article 11.073 expanded the basis for postconviction relief
based on inadequate evidence provided in 11.071 to address faulty science specifi-
cally. The statute thus applies to "scientific evidence that . . . (1) was not availa-
,,245ble ... at trial; or (2) contradicts scientific evidence relied on by the state ...
The statute allows a writ of habeas corpus to be granted if, first, "the evidence was
not ascertainable through the exercise of reasonable diligence" before or during the
trial and, second, the court finds that "had the scientific evidence been presented at
trial, on the preponderance of the evidence the person would not have been con-
victed." 2 4 6 The statute further asks the court to "[c]onsider whether the scientific
knowledge or method on which the relevant scientific evidence is based has
changed since" the trial date or dates of previously considered applications for writ
241of habeas corpus.
Under the newly enacted statute, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
granted Robbins's second application for habeas relief on the same factual basis
and allowed for a new trial.2 48 The court held that the change in opinion constituted
a change in the relevant "scientific knowledge" that contradicted scientific evi-
dence relied upon by the State because both the expert's original and revised opin-
ions were derived from the scientific method.2 49 The court further held that, had the
new evidence been available at trial, the defendant would not have been convicted
of capital murder.2 5 0
The initial five-to-four vote granting habeas relief in Robbins H reflected
judicial unease and uncertainty with the recently enacted statute. In May 2015, a
less favorable Court of Criminal Appeals, with three of the Robbins HI majority
judges retired and all of the dissenting judges remaining, granted the state's motion
for rehearing in Robbins H, making defendant's second writ application again a
251
pending writ application. In response to the court's grant of the state's motion,
the Texas legislature moved quickly to codify the Robbins H interpretation of the
statute and amended Article 11.073 by House Bill 3724 to explicitly include expert
244. Id
245. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § art. 11.073.
246. Id
247. Id
248. Ex parte Robbins, No. WR-73484-02, 2013 WL 6212218, at *1 (Tex. Crim App. Nov. 27,
2013). Among the issues requested to be briefed by the Courts were "whether Article 11.073 is a new
legal or factual basis under Article 11.07, § 4(a)(1)" and "whether 'the scientific knowledge or method
on which the relevant scientific evidence is based,' as set out in Article 11.073(d), applies to an individ-
ual expert's knowledge and method." Id
249. Exparte Robbins, 478 S.W.3d 678, 692 (Tex. Crim. App 2014) [hereinafter Robbins 1l].
250. Id
251. Exparte Robbins, No. WR-73,484-02, 2016 WL 370157, at *11 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 27,
2016) [hereinafter Robbins Ill].
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testimony in the definition of "scientific knowledge."2 52 Approved on June 20,
2015, this amendment became effective on September 1, 2015.253 The intent to ex-
pand the meaning of "scientific knowledge" is made explicit: "House Bill 3724
amends the Code of Criminal Procedure to expand the factors a court must consid-
er when making a finding as to whether scientific evidence constituting the basis
for an application for a writ of habeas corpus was not ascertainable."2 5 4
Following the adoption of the amendment, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals concluded that the state's motion for rehearing was improvidently granted
and denied the state's motion for rehearing.2 5 5 In his concurrence, Judge Alcala as-
serted that it was the change in the court's constitution that led to the granting of
the state's motion and expressed his unease about the uncertainty of the statutory
meaning:
I do not envy the position of future litigants who must try to decipher
this Court's position on when relief is warranted under the new-science
statute.. .This Court's judicial decisions should not require litigants to
run to the Legislature for a statutory response to correct our judicial mis-
takes. This Court's judicial decisions should not give the appearance of
indecision or manipulation for the achievement of a desired result. And
this Court's judicial decisions should not come half a decade too late
252. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.073, amended by Act of June 20, 2015, H.B.3724, 84th
Leg. (Tex.). The amended section reads as follows:
(d) In making a finding as to whether relevant scientific evidence was not ascer-
tainable through the exercise of reasonable diligence on or before a specific date,
the court shall consider whether the field of scientific knowledge, a testifying ex-
pert's scientific knowledge, or a scientific method on which the relevant scientific
evidence is based has changed since:
(1) the applicable trial date or dates, for a determination made with respect to an
original application; or
(2) the date on which the original application or a previously considered applica-
tion, as applicable, was filed, for a determination made with respect to a subse-
quent application.
Id (emphasis added).
253. Act of Sept. 1, 2015, ch. 1263 (H.B. 3724), 2015 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
254. Id (emphasis added). The Background and Purpose section of the Bill further makes explicit
the intent to codify specifically the holding of Robbins II:
The observers contend that a recent Texas Court of Criminal Appeals opinion
held that a change in the scientific knowledge of a testifying expert would be a
basis for habeas relief under the law. C.S.H.B. 3724 seeks to codify this deci-
sion . . . The bill specifies that the change in scientific knowledge that the court is
required to consider is a change in the field of scientific knowledge.
Crim. Juris. Comm. Rep. C.S.H.B. 3724, 84th Leg. (Tex. 2015).
255. Robbins III, supra note 251, at *1.
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while a defendant remains incarcerated based on what is clearly a
wrongful conviction.256
The ambiguity of the young statute has led to judicial uncertainty in Texas. Its effi-
cacy in expanding relief is still unclear. Other judicial renderings of the statute take
a different, more limited approach leading to a hodgepodge of reasoning over leg-
islative intent and science.257 These judicial interpretations should be brought in
line with the express legislative intent to expand avenues of postconviction relief
for convictions based on junk science.
Some case law suggests that 11.073 successfully expanded the relief ini-
tially granted under 11.071. In Ex parte Reed, the defendant's execution was
stayed pending further order of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in response to
the defendant's sixth application for writ of habeas corpus on the basis of new sci-
entific evidence under the newly enacted statute.25 8 The writ alleged that the state
presented false, misleading, and scientifically invalid testimony which violated due
process. The previous three applications were dismissed for failure to satisfy Arti-
cle 11.071.259 The order of the court is still pending.2 60
The same appellate court came to a different result in Pruett v. State.
There, the defendant was convicted of capital murder of a correctional officer and
sentenced to death.26 1 The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal,262 and the first
writ of habeas corpus denied.2 6 3 In 2013, the court granted the defendant's motion
for postconviction DNA and palm-print testing, which brought back inconclusive
results.264 The defendant's second writ of habeas corpus was dismissed because the
trial court judge, relying on the Texas DNA statute, held that it was not reasonably
probable that the applicant would have been acquitted had the new DNA and palm-
print results been available at trial.2 65 The decision was affirmed on appeal.26 6 The
256. Id. at *3 (Alcala, J. concurring).
257. Ex parte Garrett, No. WR-46210-11, 2014 WL 2491114, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. May 7,
2014); Exparte Marascio, 471 S.W.3d 832, 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
258. Exparte Reed, No. WR-50,961-07, 2015 WL 831673, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 23, 2015)
(per curiam).
259. Ex parte Reed, Nos. WR-50,961-04 & WR-50,961-05, 2009 WL 97260, at *1 (Tex. Crim.
App. Jan. 14, 2009), and No. WR-50961-06, 2009 WL 1900364, at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. July 1, 2009).
260. Id.
261. State v. Pruett, No. B-01-M015-0-PR-B, 2002 WL 34391803, at *1-3 (Tex. Dist. Apr. 30,
2002).
262. Pruett v. State, No. 74370, 2004 WL 3093232, at *5 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 22, 2004).
263. Exparte Pruett, 207 S.W.3d 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
264. Pruett v. State, NO. AP-77,037, 2014 WL 5422573, at * 1 (Tex. Crim. App Oct. 22, 2014).
265. Id. The Texas DNA statute provides:
After examining the results of testing under Article 64.03 and any comparison of
a DNA profile under Article 64.035, the convicting court shall hold a hearing and
make a finding as to whether, had the results been available during the trial of the
offense, it is reasonably probable that the person would not have been convicted.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.04 (emphasis added).
266. Pruett, 2014 WL 5422573, at *2.
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court subsequently denied defendant's application for a writ of habeas corpus
brought under 11.073 on the same factual basis, 267 because its previous holding
that the new evidence did not support a reasonable probability of applicant's ac-
quittal foreclosed habeas relief under Article 11.073, which calls for a "preponder-
ance of the evidence" standard.268
The defendant's subsequent writ application brought under Article 11.073
relied on a different form of recently discredited scientific evidence relied upon by
the state at his initial trial - physical match comparisons of masking tape, discred-
ited by the NAS Report.269 The Texas court's holding turned on its reading of the
timeliness requirement under 11.073(c), which requires "a finding as to wheth-
er relevant scientific evidence was not ascertainable through the exercise of rea-
sonable diligence on or before a specific date."270 The court held the consideration
of the claim procedurally barred for failure to satisfy the requirement.27 1 The court
reasoned that the applicant's counsel could have raised this new-scientific-
evidence claim in his 2014 writ application because the 2009 NAS Report serving
as the basis of the current claim was available at the time.272 The court thus dis-
missed the application and denied the stay of execution without reviewing the mer-
its of the claim.273
In his dissent, Judge Alcala argued for a grant of the stay and a closer ex-
amination of the evidence to fully "consider the merits of [the] complaint that junk
science played a primary role in [the defendant's] conviction" while the statutory
language regarding the timeliness requirement is clarified.274 According to the
judge, the majority misread the statute by failing to consider its meaning in the
context of the larger statutory scheme, specifically the legislative intent to allow
267. Exparte Pruett, 458 S.W.3d 535, 536-37 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
268. Id.
269. Exparte Pruett, 458 S.W.3d 537, 539-40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (Alcala, J. dissenting).




274. Id at 539 ("Too many unanswered questions with respect to the meaning and application
of Article 11.073 to permit a person to be executed for capital murder in a case in which it appears that
junk science was used to corroborate the inherently questionable inmate testimony."). The dissenting
Judge further laid out the still ambiguous elements of the statute:
Because the meaning of the temporal requirements of this statute are a matter of
first impression before us, this Court should grant applicant's motion to stay the
execution to fully consider whether it is this Court or the habeas court that should
determine whether an applicant has pleaded facts to make a prima facie showing
of "reasonable diligence" to secure the new-science evidence, whether such a
pleading requirement exists at all in this context, and whether a habeas court ra-
ther than this Court must make a finding on the question of reasonable diligence
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postconviction challenges to conviction based on junk science.2 7 5 Furthermore, be-
cause it is unclear whether the report date is enough to defeat the timeliness re-
quirement, the decision at a pleading stage is not appropriate, and the case should
be determined on its merits.2 7 6
By effectively holding that a case will be dismissed if an applicant cannot
make a prima facie case that relevant scientific evidence was not ascertaina-
ble through the exercise of reasonable diligence on or before a specific date, the
majority thus affirmed the existence of a narrow procedural bar on subsequent writ
applications.2 7 7 According to the dissenting Judge, this is in clear conflict with the
legislative intent.2 78
B. CALIFORNIA: THE WRIT OF WRATH
The California Penal Code § 1473 was amended in 1975 to include a
claim of false evidence as a basis for a writ of habeas corpus application.2 7 9 The
existing statute was amended further in 2014 by Senate Bill No. 1058 to specifical-
ly include the opinion of experts in the definition of "false evidence," either repu-
diated by the original expert or undermined by scientific or technological advanc-
es.2 80 The amendment was in large part a reaction to the case of William Joseph
275. Id at 541.
276. Id
277. Id at 541-542.
278. Id at 542.
279. CAL. PEN CODE § 1473. The 1975 Amendment added subsections (b) through (d) to the stat-
ute:
(b) A writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the follow-
ing reasons:
(1) False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt
or punishment was introduced against a person at a hearing or trial relating to his
or her incarceration.
(2) False physical evidence, believed by a person to be factual, probative, or ma-
terial on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering
a plea of guilty, which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty
by the person.
(c) Any allegation that the prosecution knew or should have known of the false
nature of the evidence referred to in subdivision (b) is immaterial to the prosecu-
tion of a writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to subdivision (b).
(d) This section shall not be construed as limiting the grounds for which a writ of
habeas corpus may be prosecuted or as precluding the use of any other remedies.
Id. (emphasis added.) Subsection (b) thus distinguished between (1) false evidence substantially materi-
al or probative of guilt and, in cases of a guilty plea, (2) material false physical evidence. Id.
280. CAL. PEN CODE § 1473 (2013 California Senate Bill No. 1058, California 2013-2014 Regular
Session, 2014 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 623 (S.B. 1058) (WEST)) The 2014 Amendment, approved in Sep-
tember 2014 and effective January 2015, added subsection (e) to the existing Cal Pen Code § 1473:
(e)(1) For purposes of this section, 'false evidence" shall include opinions ofex-
perts that have either been repudiated by the expert who originally provided the
37
Cino: Bad Science Begets Bad Convictions: The Need for Postconviction R
Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2017
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
Richards, where a 4-3 majority of the California Supreme Court denied Richards
habeas relief under the then existing § 1473 based on a repudiated forensic expert
testimony.2 8 1
Richards was convicted for first degree murder in 1997 in part on the bite
mark analysis testimony of a forensic dentist, who testified that the marks found on
the victim were both bite marks and consistent with the defendant's teeth.28 At tri-
al, the defense expert sought to repudiate the testimony by asserting that the photo-
graph distortions prevented an accurate assessment of whether the marks were
even human.2 8 3 Richards was sentenced to 25 years in prison.28 4
In 2007, Richards filed a habeas petition alleging, first, that the bite mark
evidence introduced at trial was false and, second, that new forensic evidence indi-
cated that he was wrongfully convicted.2 8 5 The state's dental expert filed a declara-
tion supporting Richards's petition, repudiating his earlier opinion.286 The expert
stated that his initial testimony was not based on scientific data and that he was no
longer certain that the mark on the victim's body was in fact a bite mark.287 Addi-
tional experts testified at the evidentiary hearing that new technology which re-
moved the distortions from the photographs made it doubtful that the indentation
was a bite mark at all.28 8
While the trial court granted Richards habeas corpus relief, the California
Court of Appeals reversed the decision and the Supreme Court of California af-
firmed, upholding his conviction.28 The California Supreme Court held that the
expert's repudiated testimony did not constitute "false evidence" under § 1473 be-
cause he did not prove it to be "objectively false."2 9 0 The repudiated testimony was
opinion at a hearing or trial or that have been undermined by later scientific re-
search or technological advances.
(2) This section does not create additional liabilities, beyond those already recog-
nized, for an expert who repudiates his or her original opinion provided at a hear-
ing or trial or whose opinion has been undermined by later scientific research or
technological advancements.
Id (emphasis added).
281. Cal S.B. 1058 (NS) (2013), 2013 CA S.B. 1058 (NS), California Committee Report; In re
Richards, 289 P.3d 860 (2012). See also Radley Balko, California's Senate has Approved an Important
New Forensics Bill, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
watch/wp/2014/04/1 l/califomias-senate-has-approved-an-important-new-forensics-bill.
282. In re Richards, 289 P.3d 860, 864-66.
283. Id at 866
284. Id
285. The new forensic evidence included: (1) DNA evidence on one of the alleged murder weap-
ons; (2) hair found under victim's fingernail; and (3) a tuft of fiber resembling fiber in his shirt not
lodged under the victims' fingernail. Richards v. Superior Court, Cal. App. 4th Dist. unpub. LEXIS
8542, *1, *10-11 (Nov. 26, 2014).
286. Id at 11.
287. Id. at 11-12.
288. In re Richards, 289 P.3d 860, 863 (Cal. 2012).
289. Id
290. Id. at 873.
38 VOL. 7
38
University of Denver Criminal Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol7/iss1/2
BAD SCIENCE BEGETS BAD CONVICTIONS
instead merely a "good faith expert opinion about a question as elusive as what
may have caused an indistinct bruise."2 9 1 Furthermore, considered as "new evi-
dence," the repudiated testimony did not justify habeas relief as it did not "point
unerringly to innocence," even when considered cumulatively with the other new
forensic evidence. 292
The Richards dissent noted that § 1473(b) did not make a distinction be-
tween lay and expert testimony and that there was no reason to make such a dis-
tinction, where the majority opinion placed a heavier burden on a defendant seek-
293
ing relief from false expert testimony. In 2013, Richards filed a motion
requesting further DNA testing which was subsequently denied because "favorable
DNA test results would raise only an abstract, indeed speculative possibility of a
more favorable verdict." 2 9 4
In light of this decision, the California legislature passed two bills ad-
dressing wrongful convictions: Senate Bill No. 1058 (amending Section § 1473)
and Senate Bill 618 (codifying the In re Clark standard for new evidence relied on
in Richards). While Senate Bill No. 1058 amended § 1473 to include the opinion
of experts in the definition of "false evidence," as part of 2013 Cal SB 618, the leg-
islature also passed § 1485.55, codifying "new evidence" as a possible basis for
habeas relief 295 Section 1485.55 (g) defines "new evidence" as evidence "not
available or known at the time of trial that completely undermines the prosecution
case and points unerringly to innocence." The section thus incorporates both a
timeliness and sufficiency of evidence requirement. Case law interpreting the
statutory changes has been limited to date.2 96
291. Id at 873. The court points to the "tentative" nature of the opinion by emphasizing the lan-
guage used, that "petitioner's dentition is 'consistent with' the bite mark." The court elaborates further:
" . . . in the case of a tentative opinion regarding a subjective question, the opinion is not proved false if,
as here, the petitioner's experts concede it might be true. Otherwise, every criminal case becomes a
never-ending battle of experts over subjective assertions that can never be conclusively determined one
way or the other." Id
292. Id at 868-69 (quoting In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 766 (Cal. 1993)).
293. Id at 869-70, 877-78.
294. Richards, Cal. App. 4th Dist. unpub. LEXIS 8542, *20.
295. Cal. S.B.618, 2013 Chapter 800. (Cal. 2013). The relevant portion of Section 1485.55 states,
"(g) For the purposes of this section, 'new evidence' means evidence that was not available or known at
the time of trial that completely undermines the prosecution case and points unerringly to innocence."
296. See Jones v. Davis, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120213, *1, *4-5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2015) (impos-
ing a diligence requirement on false evidence and filing findings and recommendations denying capital
defendant's stay-and-abeyance motion and writ of habeas corpus in part due to a lack of diligence be-
cause defendant could have obtained the psychologist expert's changed opinion sooner, despite the only
recent explicit inclusion of repudiated expert opinion as "false evidence" warranting relief under §
1473). Jones v. Davis, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42823 *1, *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2016) (affirming the
magistrate's findings after conducting a de novo review). See also Keiper v. Holland, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 175016 *1, n.8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2015) (filing findings and recommendations holding that the
forensic pathologist's later testimony does not constitute "false evidence" under Cal. Pen. Code §1473
because it has not been repudiated or undermined by later scientific advances and Cal. Pen. Code § 1473
inapplicable as a basis for habeas relief after the pathologist stated that there were "smaller abrasions
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Further amendments are currently pending in the legislature affecting both
§ 1473 and § 1485.55. The proposed amendments set forth the evidentiary and
timeliness requirements governing habeas claims based specifically on new evi-
dence.2 97 While significantly lessening the sufficiency of evidence standard under
which a writ of habeas corpus may be granted based on new evidence, the pro-
posed amendments include a repeated timeliness requirement. Like the existing
statute, the proposed amendments do not explicitly address forensic or scientific
evidence but continue to defer to broad language of "false" and "new" evidence.
The initial version of the bill added "new evidence" as a basis for habeas
relief to § 1473 and lowered the bar from evidence that "points unerringly to inno-
cence" to evidence that "raises a reasonable probability of a different outcome."29
The subsequent version of the bill further replaced the "reasonable probability"
standard with evidence "of such decisive force and value that it would have more
likely than not changed the outcome of the trial." 299
The proposal defined "new evidence" as evidence discovered after trial
"that could not have been discovered prior to trial by the exercise of due dili-
gence," thereby articulating a temporal and diligence requirement.300 The currently
pending proposal further reiterates the timeliness component by requiring that the
"new evidence" be "presented without substantial delay."3 0 1 References to "new
that you might be able to exclude" from being the cause of death when pathologist earlier testified that
the cause of death were multiple and combined blunt impact injuries to the head). See also People v.
Johnson, 235 Cal. App. 4th 80, 91 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 2015) (holding that even while the new version
of the DSM may cast doubt on the validity of a paraphilic coercive disorder diagnosis, it does not reflect
"scientific research that undermines expert testimony diagnosing that disorder and renders that testimo-
ny false evidence" when the commitment of a sexually violent predator does not have to be based on a
disorder uniformly recognized by the mental health community).
297. CA S.B. 69 (2015)- Failed.
298. 2015 Bill Text CA S.B. 694, Reg. Leg. Sess. (Cal. Feb. 27, 2015). In the initial proposal, Sec-
tion 1473(b) was to include an additional section that states: "(3) NEW EVIDENCE EXISTS WHICH
WOULD RAISE A REASONABLE PROBABILITY OF A DIFFERENT OUTCOME IF A NEW
TRIAL WERE GRANTED. Id The identical phrase "RAISES A REASONABLE PROBABILITY OF
A DIFFERENT OUTCOME IF A NEW TRIAL WERE GRANTED" was added throughout Section
1485.55 to lessen the petitioner's evidentiary burden.
299. 2015 Bill Text CA S.B. 694, Reg. Leg. Sess. (Cal. July 16, 2015). The proposed
1473(b)(3)(A) states: "New evidence exists whc old raiqe a reasabl prabilig o a different
:te if a new trial were graited. THAT IS CREDIBLE, MATERIAL, AND OF SUCH DECISIVE
FORCE AND VALUE THAT IT WOULD HAVE MORE LIKELY THAN NOT CHANGED THE
OUTCOME AT TRIAL. Id
300. Id. The added Section 1473(b)(3)(B) states: "FOR PURPOSES OF THIS SECTION, "NEW
EVIDENCE" MEANS EVIDENCE THAT HAS BEEN DISCOVERED AFTER TRIAL, THAT
COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED PRIOR TO TRIAL BY THE EXERCISE OF DUE
DILIGENCE, AND IS ADMISSIBLE AND NOT MERELY CUMULATIVE, CORROBORATIVE,
COLLATERAL, OR IMPEACHING." Id
301. 2015 Bill Text CA S.B. 694, Reg. Leg. Sess. (Cal. Feb. 28, 2016).
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evidence" are removed from Section 1485.55,302 which is designed only to regulate
appropriations in cases of granted habeas relief.303
These statutes are not perfect, but they are necessary. The procedural op-
tions a prisoner might embark on to demonstrate innocence do not offer a true road
to challenging a conviction based upon old or bad science. The lack of these stat-
utes may be of little concern to legislators in an era when criminal justice reform is
popular but letting people out of prison is not. I am reminded of the late Supreme
Court Justice Antonin Scalia's message in the Troy Davis case: "This Court has
never held that the Constitution forbids the execution of a convicted defendant who
has had a full and fair trial but is later able to convince a habeas court that he is
'actually' innocent."3 0 4 What might be discredited science today was okay yester-
day and that seems to make it fair.
V. PROPOSAL: DON'T MESS WITH TEXAS (WELL, MAYBE JUST A LITTLE...)
Junk science statutes are difficult pieces of legislation to stitch together.
Regardless of the amount of work invested, these laws necessarily lean more to-
ward a one-size-fits-all rather than an individualized remedy. Moreover, by their
nature, junk science statutes must be reactive rather than proactive because it ap-
plies solely to the postconviction phase. Consequently, junk science statutes cannot
prevent a wrongful conviction from occurring. Criminal justice remedies are im-
perfect for a number of reasons, but the imperfection is particularly acute in the
field of wrongful convictions because even a positive end result (freedom) will al-
ways be tainted by the harm (years of wrongful imprisonment).
None of those are good reasons to avoid putting junk science statutes on
the books, but with only two states entering the fray, it certainly appears that most
lawmakers would rather not have the tough conversation (or admit) that sometimes
even science gets it wrong and produces bad convictions. There should be some-
thing unsettling and unfair about someone spending the rest of (or even a portion
of) his or her life in prison because we put too much confidence behind shoddy
science.
There is no wiggle room: we have a responsibility to correct inaccurate
forensic conclusions and remedy unjust results. Even if the justice system holds
fast to finality rather than fairness, our moral code should provide an avenue of re-
lief for discredited science-such as the hundreds of cases that now hang in the
balance due to the revelation that microscopic hair evidence is unreliable. In its
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 955 (2009) (Scalia, J. dissenting). In 1994, Justice Scalia also voted
against a petition asking the Supreme Court to review the case of Henry McCollum. McCollum was
North Carolina's longest-serving death row inmate. McCollum and his half-brother Leon Brown were
convicted of raping and killing an 11-year-old girl. They were later exonerated in 2014 after DNA evi-
dence cleared them of the crime. Corey Adwar, Justice Scalia Says Executing the Innocent Doesn't Vio-
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starkest form, when corrupted evidence is used to sustain a conviction it causes our
criminal justice system itself to be unreliable.
I will quickly dispose of the California statute because in my mind it re-
quires such a narrow situation that it is mostly useless to address the real problem
with flawed forensic evidence. True, there is at least an attempt to retrofit that bill
to make it more accessible. The rewrite, if passed, may change my assessment, but
as it stands, that statute helps but a few individuals who are able to demonstrate
that the evidence is false. For inmates, the message is "don't bother." The Texas
statute, on the other hand, merits real consideration for widespread adoption.
At base, the Texas statute is fundamentally a good statute, and we do not
need to reinvent the wheel when we can instead plug a few holes. First, it gets the
standard of proof right. Preponderance of the evidence appreciates the realities of
these cases: they are difficult to bring and rarely win. Sometimes DNA exists, but
in other cases there is no DNA, and imposing any higher burden would (practically
speaking) likely derail most of the non-DNA cases ab initio. Of course, cases
based mostly on eyewitness testimony would still be doomed under this stand-
ard.305
My endorsement of the Texas statute, however, should not be interpreted
as an assessment of perfection, but rather a reflection of practicability. Texas is a
large, conservative state that to its credit is attempting to tackle problems in foren-
sic science. I do take issue with some of its phrasing, namely the use of "changed"
science. What constitutes a change in science? As Simon Cole notes, there are
many ambiguities attached to the nebulous phrase "changed scientific knowledge"
which make it difficult to deduce an objective assessment:
[D]oes it inhere in an individual or a collective; which individual or col-
lective; and what constitutes change -mean that courts will as ample
leeway for interpretation as they have had over the admissibility of sci-
entific evidence. What constitutes changed scientific knowledge will be,
unfortunately, in the eye of its judicial beholder."306
I cannot agree more. Much like the assessment of the reliability of forensic science
on the front end of a case, the determination by a judge as to what qualifies as
"changed scientific knowledge" is inherently treacherous. Is it along the lines of
undermining an entire forensic discipline, such as hair microscopy or bite mark ev-
idence? Is it something less-such as a voluntary certification body changing re-
porting terminology such that older convictions could be called in to question like
latent print comparisons? Do changed probability calculations meet the threshold,
as in the DNA mixture cases? As Cole observes, "change is more conceptual; it
305. First, experts on the problems with eyewitness testimony often are not allowed to testify be-
cause courts deem it to be within the common knowledge of a jury that eyewitnesses might be wrong,
so any "change" in the science of eyewitness identification probably would not qualify under this stat-
ute.
306. Simon A. Cole, Changed Science Writs. _ AM. BAR Assoc. J. LIT. _ (forthcoming 2016)
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concerns the proper way of interpreting and reporting the testimony. Moreover, the
scientific change did not consist of anyone 'inventing' or 'discovering' anything.3 07
Indeed, for years, lawyers and scholars have attempted to draw attention
to the shortcomings of pattern identification evidence-hair, fiber, toolmarks, fin-
gerprints and the like. Until 2009, (when the NAS Report was released), these crit-
icisms seemed like picky defense attorneys seizing the research of scientists un-
trained in the forensic disciplines to try and poke holes in well-established tech-
techniques. The tide appears to be changing-if ever slowly-with research now
underway by the National Institute of Technology and other research partnerships
among crime labs and universities to develop standards and probabilistic method-
ologies for the strength and quantification of forensic evidence. But that does little
for the "thousands of inmates [who] were convicted on forensic evidence reported
in a categorical, qualitative fashion that. . . often overstated the probative value of
the evidence."30 8 Mechanisms that help these prisoners challenge that evidence are
lacking (with Texas as the standout) or poorly written (see California's statute).
I would eliminate the word "changed" all together because it is too nar-
row. Moreover, while the delineated circumstances in which a court can consider
the so-called change-"the field of scientific knowledge, a testifying expert's sci-
entific knowledge, or a scientific method on which the relevant scientific evidence
is based"3 0 9-seem broad, they also seem to be an exclusive list. If interpreted nar-
rowly, this omits other circumstances that might warrant a junk science statute,
such as fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of qualification by the examiner. A
change in probabilistic formulas might also escape review. Additionally, I would
not link those delineated circumstances to the determination of whether the scien-
tific evidence could have been discovered (as section 11.073(d) does). Instead, I
would link those (and broaden them) to the determination of whether the evidence
would have produced a different result by a preponderance of the evidence.
Of course, this begs the question of whether there is a way to craft a junk
science statute that affirmatively addresses all of the concerns and in a way that
does not deter or impede the current research being done to improve forensic sci-
ence. There must also be an understanding that these statutes are not the proper
mechanism for wide-scale case reviews, like those taking place for hair microsco-
py and bite marks. Beyond case-based reviews, the American Association for Ad-
vancement of Science is undertaking sweeping reviews of forensic science disci-
plines, and NIST and the National Commission on Forensic Science have spent the
better part of three years evaluating forensics from top-to-bottom.310 These case
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. Art. 11.073.
310. Forensic Science Assessments: A Quality and Gap Analysis, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE, http://www.aaas.org/page/forensic-science-assessments-quality-and-
gap-analysis. Unfortunately, recent events are poised to bring the work of the National Commission on
Forensic Science to a possible standstill. The Trump administration announced on April 10, 2017 that it
would dismantle the Commission. See Jessica Gabel Cino, Sessions Assault on Forensic Science Will
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and science reviews are perhaps in a better position to study and prevent future
wrongful convictions and eliminate the continued use of shoddy science. Corre-
spondingly, the junk science statute is the most direct way for an innocent person
to respond to the findings of those reviews and investigations and obtain relief
The various entities should work in tandem and share information because keeping
an innocent person in limbo while a reviewing body performs long-term evalua-
tions may only extend the time spent in prison.
Thus, I propose a few tweaks to the Texas statute (see Appendix). The
proposal is an effort to correct the shortcomings of challenges to scientific evi-
dence under current postconviction procedures married with the promise of junk
science statutes. It removes "changed" from the calculus altogether, because that
term is plagued by ambiguity and detriment. I also think it is important that a per-
son neither runs afoul nor exhausts other state or federal remedies by taking ad-
vantage of this legislation. Foreclosure and finality may have a place in the crimi-
nal justice system, but the time has come to stop letting them be the drivers of the
system. Science is not static: what is thought to be reliable today may require more
than one challenge as the science improves, so I have attempted to correct the con-
cern that a successive petition might be outright denied. Science evolves, as should
the way in which we approach innocence and wrongful convictions.
VI. CONCLUSION
French mathematician and physicist Jules Henri Poincare wrote: "Science
is facts; just as houses are made of stones, so is science made of facts; but a pile of
stones is not a house and a collection of facts is not necessarily science."3 11 Our
criminal justice system depends increasingly on forensic science to fill the gaps
that ordinary facts cannot. We should therefore expect more from science if we
continue to couch convictions within its confines. Because the criminal justice in-
frastructure devotes a tremendous amount of energy to preserving convictions, it is
difficult to see its weaknesses laid bare as something that ultimately will strengthen
the system. But the unmasking of those weaknesses will be the opportunity to cor-
rect decades of fundamentally flawed forensic applications.
Being right should not matter more than doing right. Perhaps part of the
reason that admitting a mistake becomes so untenable is that it opens up the figura-
tive floodgates to questions about other cases. Numerous crime lab scandals
around the country have made the cogs of the criminal justice system leery of com-
ing forward with errors. Junk science statutes provide the system with a much
needed ability to be more accepting of mistakes. While we have made some strides
through the work of the Innocence Project and other groups, changing the status
quo is an uphill battle. DNA statutes that provide for postconviction testing were a
good starting point for innocence, but they cannot also be our end point. Relief
Lead to More Unsafe Convictions, NEWSWEEK (April 20, 2017) http://www.newsweek.com/sessionss-
assault-forensic-science-will-lead-more-unsafe-convictions-585762.
311. Jules Henri Poincare (1851-1912).
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cannot exist in a vacuum and we cannot make it available only to those who have
testable biological evidence. DNA testing alone cannot eliminate wrongful convic-
tions.
If our criminal justice system demands that guilt be proven beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, then that same system should demand accurate and reliable science.
Until we acknowledge and make an effort to correct the shortcomings of science,
the headlines on shoddy science will continue. "Changed science writs are un-
doubtedly a promising trend with the potential to bring justice to many individuals
to whom it might otherwise be denied due to an excessive legal attachment to the
principle of finality."312 We should not be content with operating a criminal justice
system that remains wedded to inferior science and continues to tolerate a certain
margin of error when things go awry. Evidence left behind at a crime scene does
not always lend itself to reliable analysis, and appreciating the limitations of foren-
sic science is a necessary step to improving the system as a whole. I submit that
widespread adoption of junk science statutes would not be the Armageddon that
some may fear. Instead, they might provide a collective sigh of relief by giving us
the opportunity to do something to correct otherwise impenetrable injustice.
312. Cole, supra note 306.
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APPENDIX
(a) This article applies to relevant scientific evidence that:
(1) was not available to be offered by a convicted person at the convicted
person's trial; or
(2) contradicts scientific evidence relied on by the state at trial.
(b) A court may grant a convicted person relief on an application for a
writ of habeas corpus if:
(1) the convicted person files an application, in the manner provided by
state law, containing specific facts indicating that:
(A) relevant scientific evidence is currently available and was not availa-
ble at the time of the convicted person's trial because the evidence was not ascer-
tainable through the exercise of reasonable diligence by the convicted person be-
fore the date of or during the convicted person's trial; and
(B) the scientific evidence would be admissible under the [applicable
state Rules of Evidence at a trial held on the date of the application; and
(2) the court makes the findings described by Subdivisions (1)(A) and (B)
and also finds that, had the scientific evidence been presented at trial, on the pre-
ponderance of the evidence the person would not have been convicted.
(c) In making a finding as to whether relevant scientific evidence was not
ascertainable through the exercise of reasonable diligence on or before a specific
date, the same claim or issue could not have been presented previously in an origi-
nal application or in a previously considered application if the claim or issue is
based on relevant scientific evidence that was not ascertainable through the exer-
cise of reasonable diligence by the convicted person on or before the date on which
the original application or a previously considered application, as applicable, was
filed.
(d) In making a finding as to whether a preponderance of evidence exists
such that the person would not have been convicted, the court shall consider the
field of scientific knowledge, the testifying expert's scientific knowledge; the scien-
tific method on which the relevant scientific evidence, or any other relevant scien-
tific testimony.
(e) Nothing in this provision shall preclude a later habeas corpus motion
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